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INTRODUCTION
INTERVENTION may be defined as the procedural device whereby a
. stranger can present a claim or defense in a pending action or in a
proceeding incidental thereto, and become a party for the purpose of the
claim or defense presented.' The right to resort to this device under
certain circumstances is absolute, while at other times it is dependent
upon the discretion of the court.2 Together, the theories of joinder of
parties and intervention offer a rationale for determining what persons
a plaintiff (and sometimes a defendant) may or must bring before a court
in a particular action, the effect of a decision therein upon non-parties,
and when non-parties may come into a pending litigation to protect
interests that are jeopardized thereby or to expedite the hearing of a
claim or defense. Intervention counterbalances the many devices of
joinder. Its utility lies in offering protection to non-parties, who obvi-
ously comprise a large and undefined group with varied interests, often-
times of tremendous financial and legal importance. An example of such
persons and interests, which comes most readily to mind, is that of
stockholders, bondholders and unsecured creditors in corporate reorgani-
zations. Because of the financial importance of the bulk of federal cases,
the number and magnitude of federal equity receiverships and reorganiza-
*The authors gratefully acknowledge the aid rendered them by Dr. Friedrich Kessler
on the Civil, Edward C. Jaegerman on the English, and Joseph Friedman on the State
aspects of intervention.
tInstructor, Yale School of Law.
*Sterling Fellow, Yale School of Law.
1. ". . . An intervention takes place when a third person is permitted to become a
party to an action or proceedings between other persons, either by joining the plaintiff in
claiming what is sought by the complaint, or by uniting with the defendant in rezisting
the claims of the plaintiff, or by demanding anything adversely to both the plaintiff and
the defendant. . ." CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. (Deering, 1931) § 387. Cf. 17 A_= & E.;o.
Excyc. or LAw (2d ed. 1900) 180; seG In Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U. S. 317, 330 (1912).
2. Infra, p. 581.
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tions under the bankruptcy law, and the jurisdictional limitations of the
federal courts, an examination of federal intervention may be of utility.
The modern theory on joinder of parties has little in common with the
restrictive and rigid common-law rules designed for simple litigation in an
era when formalism was the vogue.3  The present concept of joinder of
parties has come to us via the chancery route. By such devices as the
declaratory judgment, impleader, bill of peace with multiple parties, and
interpleader, a litigant may obtain security from peril, avoid multiplicity
of suits, and double liability.4 The adoption of the liberal joinder pro-
visions on parties in the federal equity rules of 19121 and recent federal
legislation authorizing the declaratory judgment and extending earlier
interpleader legislation illustrate the trend toward the protection needed
in a modern complex society.' Under the liberal joinder rules and the
recent legislation noted above, and no doubt under the new federal rules
to be promulgated by the Supreme Court,7 litigants are aided by flexible
3. At common law plaintiffs and defendants had to sue and be sued in the same
capacity; permissive joinder was not tolerated. SHpmA , Commxom LAW PLEAD=0 (1923)
393-399; Hinton, An American Experiment with the English Rules of Court (1926) 20 ILL.
L. RFv. 533, 535; Jones and Carlin, Nonjoinder and Misjoinder of Parties in Common
Law Actions (1922) 28 W. VA. L. Q. 197, 266.
4. See BORCLuRD, DEcLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934), on the place of the declaratory
judgment in modern procedural and substantive law. Impleader forces a third party Into
a pending action. Its utility lies in affording to a defendant reasonable certainty of
recovery on a claim over against the third party. For discussions see Bennett, Bringing in
Third Parties by the Defendant (1935) 19 MiNN. L. Rav. 163; Cohen, Impleader: Enforce-
ment of Defendants' Rights Against Third Parties (1933) 33 COL. L. Rav. 1147; Gregory,
Procedural Aspects of Securing Tort Contribution in the Injured Plaintiff's Action (1933)
47 HARv. L. Rav. 209; Gregory, Tort Contribution Practice in New York (1935) 20 Com.
L. Q. 269. For a discussion of a procedure to avoid multiplicity of suits see Chafee, Bills
of Peace with Multiple Parties (1932) 45 HARV. L. REv. 1297; and for a thorough treat-
ment of relief from double liability see Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader (1921) 30 YALra
L. J. 814; Interstate Interpleader (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 685; Interpleader in the United
States Courts (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1134; (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 41. Professor Chafee's
crusade for an adequate federal statute on interpleader seems at last to have attained Its
goal. See note 6, infra.
5. See Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-l. Pleadings and Parties (1935)
44 YALE L. J. 1291, wherein it is pointed out that these rules, with some limitations, are
representative of the modem flexible procedure.
6. See 48 STAT. 955, 28 U. S. C. A. § 400 (1934), for the Federal Declaratory Judgment
Act; and P. L. No. 422, 74th Cong., approved January 20, 1936, for the Yecent interpleader
statute.
7. See 48 STAT. 1064, 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 723b, 723c (1934), for the act giving the
Supreme Court the Yule-making power. It is discussed in Clark and Moore, A New Federal
Civil Procedure-I. The Background (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 387; id., loc. cit. supra note 6;
Clark, The Challenge of a New Federal Procedure (1935) 20 Coax. L. Q. 443; Doble, Recent
Developments in Federal Procedure (1935) 21 VA. L. REv. 876; Jaffin, Federal Procedural
Revision (1935) 21 VA. L. Rav. 504; Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-Making Power to
the Supreme Court of the United States (1934) 32 Miau. L. Rav. 1116; Wickes, The New
Rule-Making Power of the United States Supreme Court (1934) 13 TEx. L. Rav. 1.
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provisions that afford protection and give them a wide choice in the
selection of parties and issues. One about to commence an action may
often avail himself of a number of concepts in determining who the
parties, plaintiff or defendant, to the suit shall be. Examples of such
concepts are real party in interest, capacity, class suit, permissive joinder
of parties, proper, necessary and indispensable party, and joinder of
actions.$ A defendant by counterclaim, cross-claim, and particularly
impleader, exercises certain control in the determination of who may
or must be before the court.9 The point to be noted is that there are a
great number of devices and methods of control which plaintiffs and
defendants may utilize to their advantage in getting parties and issues
before the court. But what of the non-party? What protection has he
if litigants in a pending action are jeopardizing his interest? In a very
limited situation he may have himself substituted for a party.10 He
8. By being assigned a claim for collection the assignee becomes the real party in interest,
and his citizenship can thus be used to defeat federal jurisdiction. Oakley v. Goodnow,
11S U. S. 43 (18s6) (resort can be had only to state courts for protection against such
a device); Bernblum v. Travelers Ins. Co., 9 F. Supp. 34 (W. D. Mo. 1934), discussed
in (1935) 35 CoL. L. REv. 450. By suing a dealer for patent infringement a manufacturer
may often harass a competing manufacturer, for the latter is unable to supplant the
dealer as defendant since the dealer is liable as a real party in interest. See Chandler &
Price Co. v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 56 Sup. Ct. 6 (1935); Demulso Corporation v.
Tretolite Co., 74 F. (2d) S05 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934).
By the capacity concept a plaintiff may be able to sue an unincorporated association.
This can be utilized to enforce a right, or to prevent removal, as where a partnership is
defendant. See Clark and Moore, supra note 5, at 1315-1317. By bringing a class action
a plaintiff may often force parties into an action much against their will. A good example
of this is the consent receivership. See also, Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 225
U. S. 356 (1922) where particular members of the class seem to have been chosen to
found federal jurisdiction. By permissive joinder of plaintiffs a plaintiff may often attain
some of the advantages of a class suit; certainly when he uses the concept of permissive
joinder of defendants he has a wide freedom in selecting those to be made defendant.
Broad rules on joinder of actions supplement such provisions on joinder of parties. And
insofar as the concepts of necessary and indispensable parties are narrowed and emphasis
is placed on proper parties a real liberty is accorded the plaintiff. For discussion of the
federal practice on parties see Clark and Moore, loc. cit. supra note S.
9. For an excellent treatment of these subjects see Shulman and Jaegerman, Some
Jvrisdictional Limitations on Federal Procedure (1936) 45 YAM L. J. 393.
10. Where the claim is for property, and not a personal claim, the owner or one bound
to defend the title of the defendant, such as the landlord in ejectment, may have hims elf
substituted for the defendant. Hardenbergh v. Ray, 151 U. S. 112 (1894). And where
the wrong person has brought the action or been made defendant, or where the person
suing or being sued was the right person, but, because of subsequent events, a successor
in interest ought to become the plaintiff or defendant, the proper person may be substi-
tuted. See Clark and Moore, supra note 6, at 1317-1318. It should be noted that under
substitution the third person supplants a party to the action, while under intervention he
becomes an additional party. Intervention should also be distinguished from consolidation.
By consolidation two distinct actions are merged into one, while under intervention a distinct
right of action or defense is projected into a pending suit. The concept of an indi-
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may always offer himself as an amicus curiae." But it is to intervention
that non-parties must generally resort for protection or affirmative relief
in pending litigation.
Preliminary to considering federal intervention, let us briefly examine
the historical material and the modern intervention practice in England
and the states. We shall then turn to a detailed study of the right to in-
tervene in the federal courts: (1) statutes and rules governing; (2)
the right to intervene based on an interest in property in the control
of the court; (3) the right to intervene based on inadequate representa-
tion; and (4) the application of these rights in receiverships and re-
organization proceedings. In a subsequent article we propose to dis-
cuss the jurisdictional aspects of intervention, the status of an inter-
venor, and the procedure of intervention.
THE SOURCE OF MODERN INTERVENTION PRACTICE
The practice of allowing a stranger to intervene was first developed
in the civil, the ecclesiastical, and the admiralty courts. Apparently,
intervention practice in Roman law was rather extensive, although in-
tervention seems to have taken place only at the appeal stage and then
on the theory that the losing party might refuse to appeal or might not
be vigilant in prosecuting the appeal and the petitioner's interest thus
be inadequately protected. The exact meaning of the statements in
Corpus Juris that an appeal is given to him "who has an interest in the
case M 2 or "some good reason'1 3 is not apparent; but it is known that
intervention was allowed in the following cases, among possible others.
If the vendee was evicted from the property purchased, his vendor could
appeal, and moreover he could intervene if. the purchaser appeared to be
in collusion with the plaintiff.14 Furthermore, the surety of the vendor
pensable party radically expanded would lessen the need for intervention, since third
persons, who now must resort to intervention, might be classed as indispensable parties.
But because of venue restrictions, difficulty in obtaining jurisdiction over the person, and
jurisdictional limitations as to subject-matter (particularly in the diversity cases) It Is
believed that a workable procedure will place less emphasis upon the concept of Indis-
pensable parties and seek to work out justice to third persons through the device of
intervention. See Husting Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 194 Wis. 311, 216 N1. W. 833 (1927),
which narrowly restricted the concept of indispensable party.
11. See Proceedings Before the Securities and Exchange Commission, In the Matter of
Paramount-Publix Corporation (June 18, 1935) 226, for an illustrative use of "amicus
curiae" in receivership proceedings. A firm of lawyers representing the bankers for the
corporation, none of whom were parties to the receivership, seemed to dictate the appoint-
ment of the receiver and dominate the receivership. But compare Lee Moor v. Texas &
New Orleans Railroad Company, 56 Sup. Ct. 372 (1936), where the Solicitor General had
to present the government's case on the Cotton Control Act as amicus curiae.
12. 1.4 § 2 D. 49, 1. 13. 1.5 pr. D. 49, 1.
14. 1.4 § 3 D. 49, 1.
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could intervene in the suit of the purchaser.', A creditor could intervene
in a suit against his debtor, if the latter did not faithfully defend."0
Where a "testamentary heir" had been defeated by one claiming that
the will lacked necessary formalities legatees under the will and per-
sons freed by it were allowed to intervene if they could show any collu-
sion.17 It was apparently not always necessary to show that one would
be bound by the proceeding.18 Nor was it always necessary that the
intervenor show a legal interest; a humanitarian interest would suffice.
Thus, a relative of a person sentenced to death might intervene to appeal.'0
The passages in Corpus Juris dealing with intervention were broadly
interpreted by medieval writers;2" and the intervention practice of the
Roman law has survived with some limitations in the modern civil law.: '
The ecclesiastical courts introduced the Roman practice of intervention
into England. In the famous case of Dalrym ple v. Dalrymple, a third
party was said to be entitled to intervention if he "consider that his in-
terest will be affected. -2 In the United States, the Roman law influenced
the Louisiana practice, and through this practice, to some extent, the
common law of this country.23 Indigenous to the old common law and
tending to restrict the extension of rights of intervention, was an unusual
concern that the plaintiff be enabled by the courts to control his action;
the modern common law theories of joinder and intervention of parties,
however, bring us toward a rapprochement with the theories of the civil
law.
Intervention in in rem proceedings in admiralty was early developed. -
15. 1-5 pr. D. 49, 1.
16. 1.4 § 4 D. 49, 1. This is substantially true under modern French law. French
Civil Code, Art. 1166.
17. 1.5 § 1 D. 49, 1.
18. 1.5 pr. D. 49, 1. A conviction of an heir would warrant the co-helr's appeal although
he would not be bound thereby.
19. 4.2 § 3 D. 49, 1. "Nor does it make any difference whether he is nearly related
to the defendant or not; for I think that on the ground of humanity every pezeon who
appeals should be heard.' 1.6 D. 49, 1. When a mother "induced by maternal affection
appeals, it must be said that she should be heard." 5.1 § 1 D. 49, 1.
20. TArNm , Ono ruD. IV tit. 5 § 1; ScAccrA, DE .PPELLrATIo:muS QU. 5 Nr 73; 1 WAcir,
.C'vnpsozrss 616, note 3 (18S5).
21. According to § 66 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, a legal interest in the
outcome of the suit is necessary and sufficient to justify intervention at any time until
the judgment is no longer subject to appeal. 1 GA.PP-Smn=-Jo:;As, Koz= "rEAn zur ZnvIL-
PROZESS ORDUNG, § 66, annotation I.
22. 2 Hagg. Con. Rep. 137 (1811) [the quotation on intervention is given only in 2
Cnrrr , GENzA. PiACrICE (1834) 354 (italics supplied)].
23. CLARK, CODE PLEAD (1928) 287; see discussion in Gravenberg v. Laws, 100 Fed.
1 (C. C. A. 5th, 1900).
24. Stratton v. Jarvis and Brown, 8 Pet. 4, 9, (U. S. 1834) (Story, J. "This is very fami-
liar"); BEsmicT ow AUNm Tr-y (Sth ed. 1925) 414; CoNKLZG, Tim ADjwtALTy, LW AD
PRAcTIcE (2d ed. 1857) 48, 64; Hry, ADm,.m y JuRusDIcTo.N %a,D ProcMnUnE (185) 334,
§ 120; HUGHES, FnEAL PRAcricE, JURISDIcTION A.w PnocEDur (1931) § 4635.
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This was essential if the rights of third parties were to be protected, for,
otherwise, "the greatest injustice would be done, because a decree of the
court in rem is binding on all the world as to points which are directly in
judgment before it."' 25  Thus, "as a general principle it is certainly true
that in admiralty process in rem, all persons having an interest in the thing
may intervene pro interesse suo, file their claims and make themselves
parties to the cause, to defend their own interest."2 The historic admir-
alty practice is now stated in federal admiralty rules, having the force
of statute, which allow intervention when the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction is in rem," or when there is an interest in a fund in the registry
of the court.28
But in equity and at law the practice of intervention developed slowly,
and could be denied or ignored by such eminent writers as Chitty and
Story. Chitty held that the practice was confined to the ecclesiastical
and admiralty courts.29 Story ignored the subject in his book on equity
pleading. 0 Yet by the time of both Chitty and Story, intervention was
allowed in certain equitable and legal proceedings: in equity, by a device
known as an examination pro interesse suo; at law, by analogous but
more limited practice. Although modern intervention in equity and
at law has far outstripped its sources, these early developments are im-
portant, as much of the original remains.
The examination pro interesse suo in equity was granted to a third
person who claimed an interest in property under the control of the
court, in custodia legis.3' The property may have come under court con-
25. The Mary Anne, 16 Fed. Cas. No. 9,195, (D. Me. 1826) p. 953, where it was held that
:attaching creditors might intervene in admiralty proceedings for municipal forfeiture.
26. Ibid.
27. Admiralty Rule 34: "If any third person shall intervene in any cause of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction in rem on his own interest, and he is entitled, according to the
course of admiralty proceedings, to be heard therein, he shall propound the matter in
suitable allegations, to which, if admitted by the court, the other party or parties in the
suit may be required, by order of the court, to make due answer.. . ." 28 U. S. C, A. § 723.
28. Admiralty Rule 42: "Any person having an interest in any proceeds in the registry
-of the court shall have a right by petition and summary proceedings to intervene pro
interesse suo for a delivery thereof to him . ." See 28 U. S. C. A. § 723.
Benedict takes the position that modern intervention practice in admiralty is not limited
by the admiralty Yules to cases where the action is in rem or where funds are in the registry
of the court. He argues that intervention should be allowed in in personam actions, adopting
the present practice of other federal courts. BENEDicr ON Aon n~r (Sth ed. 1925) 414.
29. 2 CT-rv GENEPAL PRACICE (1834) 493-494
30. SToRy, EQurrY PLEADInG (9th ed. 1&79).
31. 1 Siur's C NacERY PRAcTIcE (1839) 449-450; Eliot, Intervention In The Federal
Courts (1897) 31 Aar. L. Rav. 377, 380. The statement is made that "nothing appears
clearer than that in the absence of some statute authorizing it, there can, strictly speaking,
be no intervention in a suit in equity." 123 Am. St. Rep. 280, 281 (1908). But this Is
clearly incorrect. It is also stated, "Unless some statute has authorized it, there can be
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trol by sequestration or receivership. As sequestration was always inci-
dental to the suit, intervention in that type of situation would be in the
incidental and not in the main litigation.32  Receivership on the other
hand, as a practical matter, might be either an incidental or the main
objective of suit, and hence intervention in such litigation would depend
upon the character of the receivership. But no matter what the charac-
ter of the receivership might be, intervention would be clearly necessary
if the third party was to be protected during the period of the receiver-
ship, which might be of long duration.3 3 He could not successfully main-
tain an action against the receiver save by permission of the court, and it
appears that this permission was available only if the third party pre-
sented his claim by intervention.3
The procedure of an examination pro interesse suo is described by
Daniell. "The proper course ... is to apply to the Court to direct the
plaintiff to exhibit interrogatories before one of the masters in order
that the party applying may be examined as to his title to the estate.",
But if the facts were not in dispute the intervenor was not required to
go before a master. Thus, when the creditors of the tenant had seques-
tered the leasehold, the landlord, one Sir Joseph Banks, was allowed to
intervene to receive rent in arrears, and the court refused to send Sir
Joseph to the master. "In a clear case the Court will not send parties
into the Master's office merely that they may return with the rights
as plain as when they went. The facts are not in dispute; and a question
of law is more fitly discussed here than before the master."-" The prin-
no intervention in an action at law." 123 Am. St. Rep. 280, 295 (1908). If this is taken
to mean that thee can be no intervention in legal proceedings incidental to the main action,
it is also clearly incorrect. Foster apparently believes that the historical intervention pro
interesse suo was allowed at common law as well as in equity. 2 Fosra_, FEnanL Pn,%rxcn
(6th ed. 1920) § 258-h.
32. As in Dixon v. Smith, 1 Swans 457 (Ch. 1818), or in Walker v. Bell, 2 Afadd. 21
(Ch. 1816) where mortgagees were allowed to intervene in the sequestration of rents and
profits.
33. In re Hoare, [1892] 3 Ch. 94, 98.
34. In one case, where the receiver was given leave to defend an action brought by
third parties, we are told that "the Lord Chancellor expre-ssed doubt about it, and asT:ed
why the parties would not come desiring to be examined pro inferessc suoy ' Anonymous,
6 Ves. 287 (Ch. 1801). Leave was given only after a report that this was for the benefit
of all the parties.
Originally, a third party claiming an interest in specific property sequestered by court
order could not institute a separate proceeding at law against the sequestrator, but was
required to come into the action and be examined pro interesst uo. Hamlyn v. Lee,
1 Dick. 94 (Ch. 1743); James v. Dore, 2 Dick. 788 (Ch. 1744); Hunt v. Priest, 2 Dick.
540 (Ch. 1778); Empringham v. Short, 3 Hare 461 (Ch. 1844). But, without either the
claimant's application or consent the court had no authority to compel the examination.
Kaye v. Cunningham, 5 Madd. 406 (Ch. 1820). Cf. Musadee BMahomed Cazum Sherazwe
v. Meerza Ally Mahomed Shoostry, and Bebee Mfariam Begum, 6 Mfoo. Ind. App. 27 (1854).
35. 1 DA.,anmr's CHAmcEmv (1845) § 644.
36. Dixon v. Smith, 1 Swans 457 (Ch. 1818).
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ciple of this old case is relevant to modern reorganization practice. Here,
as will be shown later, the tendency of the courts has been to require a
petitioner to present his claim before a master, even though, actually,
the "facts" may be undisputed, the sole question being as to the legal
interpretation of facts embodied in the phrase "fairness of the plan."
Naturally, intervention was allowed more freely in equity than at law,
for, at law the action was regarded as the plaintiff's, and the prejudice
against multiple parties and issues resulted in strict rules of joinder.
But in a proceeding incidental to the law action, such as attachment, and
in a possessory action such as replevin, intervention was commonly allowed
by statute and less frequently by judicial decision.,, An old Maryland
case, relied on by many modern decisions to justify intervention in such
proceedings without the aid of statute, stated: "For any apparent defect
in the proceedings before the court, the attachment may be quashed upon
suggestion of such defect to the court, either by the defendant himself,
or a third person claiming an interest in the property attached."", Such
intervention operated to bar some remedies otherwise available. Thus,
a third person claiming property attached and sold by a sheriff was held
to have no claim against the sheriff in trespass, since the third person's
remedy was to have "appeared if he had thought fit, and moved the court
to.. . . exonerate it from the effect and operation of the attachment.""0
The fact that the intervenor could maintain an independent action for
conversion has been usually held not to defeat his intervention rights.40
In a recent case,41 Judge Hutcheson left open the question whether
intervention might be allowed in the main proceeding in a law as dis-
tinguished from an equity suit.' The history of intervention recounted
in the preceding paragraphs shows intervention being allowed in admiralty
where a judgment would bind the world, in equity where property "was
in the hands of the court, and in a limited manner at law in an incidental
or possessory proceeding. In all of these cases the presence of property
37. See infra note 56; Note (1921) 20 MIcH. L. Rav. 96. See CLARKP, CoDE PLrADINO
(1928) 287, § 65. There is a general discussion in notes (1909) 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 536;
123 Am. St. Rep. 308-310 (1908).
38. Campbell v. Morris, 3 Harr. & McH. 535, 552 (Md. 1797). See Wallace v. Maroney,
6 MacKey's Rep. 221, 223 (D. C. 1887). In Clarke, Dodge, Maxwell v. Meixsell and Grafton,
29 Md. 221 (1868), intervention was allowed a lien creditor in a prior attachment suit in
order to; show that the court had no jurisdiction. Practical intervention was obtained by
forcing the plaintiff to join the petitioner as defendant in Buckman v. Buckman, 4 N. H.
319 (1828).
39. Ranahan v. O'Neale Jr., 6 Gill & J. 298, 302 (Md. 1834).
40. This is discussed in Houston Real Estate Inv. Co. v. Hechler, 138 Pac. 1159 (Utah,
1914).
41. Burrow v. Citizens' State Bank, 74 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
42. The learned judge, in pointing out that the appellants had cited a replevin case,
apparently had in mind the limited nature of intervention historically allowed at law,
that is, in incidental or possessory actions.
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in the hands of the court seems to have been the determining factor;
there is little discussion of law or equity. The appearance of a third
party may be more foreign to law than to equity. On the other hand the
history of intervention does not compel any distinction as to whether it
is an essentially legal or equity practice. It may be doubted whether
the distinction would be useful.
The history of intervention, however, does show the development of a
device by the courts to keep their processes from doing injury to third
persons. The development began where injury was most likely to occur.
Without intervention in admiralty proceedings, a third person having an
interest in property in the hands of the court would have been bound by
a decree of that court without a hearing. The judgment, binding on all
the world, would be res judicata. Without the examination pro intercsse
suo in equity, and the analogous practice at law, a third person having
an interest in property in custodid legis, while not necessarily bound by
the decree of the court unless represented in the action, would, as a
practical matter, have been seriously prejudiced. Modern intervention
practice, as will be seen, is an expansion of what seems to have always
been the underlying principle in the development of intervention: the
purpose of the courts to prevent their processes from being used to the
prejudice of the rights of interested third persons 3
The modern English intervention practice may be said to be an out-
growth of admiralty practice in rem and the examination pro interesse
suo. Although there is no express general rule, intervention is allowed
as of right in the following cases: where the petitioner has or claims
an interest in the subject matter of an in ren proceeding (admiralty
actions in rein, receiverships, actions for the recovery of land, and probate
proceedings);' in class actions, where the petitioner is inadequately
43. Eliot, Intervention in the Federal Courts (1897) 31 Ams. L. REv. 377.
44. See 0. 12, r. 24, Rules of the Supreme Court; The Byzantion, 127 L. T. R. 756
(P. D. & A. 1922); The Zigurds [1932] P. 113, continuing as heretofore intervention in
admiralty actions in rein.
Where a third per'son claims realty which is the subject of a receivership he may be
permitted to bring an ancillary suit. Anonymous, 6 Ves. 287 (Ch. 1801); Angel v. Smith,
9 Ves. 336 (Ch. 1804); Lane v. Capsey [1891] 3 Ch. 411. But where it is more con-
venient to try third party claims to the subject matter in the receivers-hip action, inter-
vention is the permissible practice. In re Metropolitan Amalgamated Estates, Ltd.j [1912]
2 Ch. 497; K]aR, Rz cr vRzs (10th ed. 1935) 38. Third party claims against the teceiver
with respect to the conduct of his duties are properly the subject of intervention. Searle
v. Choate 25 Ch. D. 723 (1884); In re Maidstone Palace of Varieties Ltd., [1909] 2 Ch.
283.
See 0. 12, r. 25, Rules of the Supreme Court; Minet v. Johnson, 63 L. T. R. 507 (Ct.
Opp. 1890) (intervention permitted in actions for recovery of land).
See 0. 12, r. 23, Rules of the Supreme Court Crickitt v. Crickitt, [1902] P. 177 (Supreme
Court rule authorizing the intervention in probate proceedings is an embodiment of earlier
practice). Cf. Wytcherley v. Andrews, L. R. 2 P. & D. 327 (1871)].
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represented, as, for example, a dissentient minority bondholder;"' in
execution proceedings where the petitioner is a claimant of the property
levied upon;46 in divorce proceedings, where intervention is allowed to
the King's Proctor, to a co-respondent, and to a qualified extent to any
member of the public.47 And by judicial interpretation of the rule on
non-joinder the court has discretion in allowing intervention to third
parties.4" In effect it may be said that the absolute and discretionary
right would seem to cover the entire field where intervention is warranted.
The procedural laboratories of the many states should furnish valuable
data on the utility of and the trend toward extending or delimiting the
use of intervention. It has been said that intervention can be justified
only when authorized by statute or court rule." But intervention has
been expressly allowed in the absence of such provisions on the theory
that the court has inherent power to regulate its procedure in adjusting
conflicting claims to property subject to its control 0 On the whole,
45. Wilson v. Church, 9 Ch. D. 552 (1878); Fraser v. Coope'r, Hall & Co., 21 Ch. D.
718 (1882); see Watson v. Cave (1), 17 Ch. D. 19 (1881). Compare the English rule
on representative actions, 0. 16, r. 9, Rules of the Supreme Court, which does not
specifically provide for intervention of a member of the class inadequately represented,
with the Indian rule, 0. 1, r. 8 (1), (2), The First Schedule, which does provide for inter-
vention.
46. 0. 57, r. 12, 16, Rules of the Supreme Court.
47. The King's Proctor: J. A. 1925 §§ 181, 182; Roberts v. Roberts, [1916) P. 187-;
Bainbridge v. Bainbridge, [1934] P. 66.
The Co-respondent: Wade v. Wade, [1903] P. 16 (may recover costs if succe sful); cf. Darn-
birough v. Darnbrough, 45 T. R. 603 (P. D. & A. 1929). But see Farrell v. Farrell, 76 L. T. R.
167 (P. D. & A. 1896); Harrop v. Harrop, [1899] P. 61; Lowe v. Lowe, [18991 P. 204,
denying intervention to the co-respondent named in the husband's answer, where the relief
asked by the husband was the dismissal of the wife's petition; and Grieve v. Grieve, [18931
P. 288, denying intervention to the co-respondent named by the King's Proctor.
A Member of the Public: J. A. 1925 § 183 (2); Woodhead v. Woodhead, 23 T. R. 334
(P. D. & A. 1907).
48. Re Fowler, 142 L. T. J. 94 (Ch. 1916), interpreting the rule on non-joinder, 0. 16,
r. 11, Rules of the Supreme Court. Where persons who in the federal courts would be
"necessary" but not "indispensable" parties are not joined, because they are out of the
jurisdiction (and suit in England in most instances must be instituted by personal service)
or because of a sovereign's immunity from suit, they may apply to the court for admission
as parties. Security for costs is usually required. Vavasseur v. Krupp, 9 Ch. D. 351 (1878) ;
Apollinaris Co. v. Wilson, 31 Ch. D. 632 (1886); In re La Compagnie Generale, (1891]
3 Ch. 451, 458; In re La Societe Anonyme Des Verreries De L'Etoile, W. N. 119 (Ch.
1893); Maatschappij Voor Fondsenbezit v. Shell Transport & Trading Co., [1923] 2
K. B. 166.
49. See Potlatch Lumber Co. v, Runkel, 16 Idaho 192, 196, 101 Pac. 396, 397 (1909) ; note
123 Am. St. Rep. 280, 281 (1908).
50. Stieff v. Bailey, 27 Del. 508, 89 At]. 366 (1913) (replevin-justified on ground of
necessity); Banker's Co. v. Sanford, 138 At]. 361 (Del. 1927) (attachment); Parson v.
Eureka Powder Works, 48 N. H. 66 (1868) ("any person who can satisfy the court that he
has any rights involved in the trial of a cause may be admitted to prosecute oI defend the
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however, the matter has been provided for in some manner. In one
group of states intervention has been given to any person "who has an
interest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either of the parties
to the action, or an interest against both"; in another group, intervention
is limited to a person claiming an interest in real or personal property,
which is the subject of the action.5' Obviously this latter type of statute
is narrow and excludes actions for debts or for money damages, even
though the petitioner claims that the right belongs to him.52 The first
type of statute is similar to Federal Equity Rule 37 on intervention,
except that the statutes of this group usually do not require the inter-
vention to be "in subordination to and in recognition of the propriety
of the main proceeding." 3 Some courts have given this type of statute
a narrow interpretation, holding the statute inapplicable to proceedings
incidental to the main litigation, such as attachment.0 -4 Such construc-
tions, however, have often been followed by statutes allowing inter-
action"); Whitman v. Willis, 51 Tex. 421 (1879) (common law); Pool v. Canford, 52 Tex.
621 (1880) ("rests on the principle that a party should be permitted to do that voluntarily
which, if known, a court of equity would require to be done"); see also Armour Car Lincs v.
Summerour, 5 Ga. App. 619, 63 S. E. 667 (1908); Potts v. Wilson, 158 Ga. 316, 123 S. E. 294
(1924); Sims v. Goettle, 82 N. C. 268 (18SO).
51. See CLARY, CODE PLEnanO (1928) 287; Comment (1933) 43 Y1,LE L. J. 127. The
New York provision is: "Where a person not a party to the action has an interest in the sub-
ject thereof, or in real property the title to which may in any manner be affected by the judg-
ment, or in real property for injury to which the complaint demands relief, and makes appli-
cation to the court to be made a party, it must direct him to be brought in by the proper
amendment." N. Y. Civ. PRAC. Act (1935) § 193 (3). The decisions by the Court of Ap-
peals seem to limit its application to actions for the recovery of specific real or perzonal
property. Chapman v. Forbes, 123 N. Y. 532, 26 N. E. 3 (1890) ; Bauer v. Dewey, 166 N. Y.
402, 60 N. E. 30 (1901) ; d. Wilcox v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 235 N. Y. 590, 139 N. E. 746
(1923). For adverse criticism of the Chapnian and Bauer cases see Medina, Some Phases of
the New York Civil Practice Act and Rules (1921) 21 COL. L. Rnv. 113. Intervention in
actions for money damages has been allowed, however, in lower court cases. Merchant's Nat.
Bank of Norwich v. Hagemeyer, 4 App. Div. 52, 38 N. Y. Supp. 626 (1st Dept. 1896) ; Bulova
v. S. S. Corporation, 194 App. Div. 418, 185 N. Y. Supp. 424 (1t Dept. 1920); Feinberg v.
American Surety Co., 33 Misc. 458, 67 N. Y. Supp. 868 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
52. Chapman v. Forbes, 123 N. Y. 532, 26 N. E. 3 (1830); Bauer v. Dewey, 166 N. Y.
402, 60 N. E. 30 (1901); Brooklyn Cooperage Co. v. Sherman Lumber Co., 220 N. Y. 642,
115 N. E. 715 (1917); Marion County Lumber Corp. v. Whipple, 118 S. C. 90, 110 S. E. 70
(1921); CLARY, CODE PLEAD G (1923) 288; Poirn-oy, CODE R.irmins (5th ed. 1929) §§ 312,
321, 322.
53. See FLA. Coa-'. Gan. LAws ANN. (Supp. 1934) § 4918 (2), and Mxcu. Coar. L.wvs
(1929) § 14019, which require intervention to be "in subordination to and in recognition of the
propriety of the main proceedings, unless otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion."
54. Chase v. Washtenaw, 214 Mich. 288, 183 N. W. 63 (1921), criticized by Sunderland,
Note (1921) 20 Macn. L. REv. 96; Dunker v. Jacobs, 79 Neb. 435, 112 N. W. 579 (1907);
Gels v. Geis, 125 Neb. 394, 250 N. IV. 252 (1933), approved in Note (1934) 12 Nn. L. Bu.
310; Consolidated Liquor Co. v. Scoteilo & Nizzi, 21 N. M. 485, 155 Pac. 1089 (1916) (re-
sult conceded illogical but following from precedents).
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vention in the excluded area.5 So in nearly all states, either by a general
statute on intervention, specific statutes, or judicial decisions, a third
person may intervene in attachment and execution proceedings and in
replevin actions.56
.A composite case picture illustrates the general trend as to what parties
and interests will support intervention. It has been allowed to an owner
or lienholder of property subject to court control;"' a claimant to a fund
or property in the possession of a court for purposes of administration
55. Michigan amended its statute to permit a third person claiming attached property to
file a motion to Yelease the attachment, after the decision of Chase v. Washtenaw, 214 Mich,
288, 183 N. W. 63 (1921). MIcH. ComP. LAWS (1929) § 14019. New Mexico now hag a
statute expressly permitting intervention in attachment proceedings. N. M. STAT. AN.
(Courtright, 1929) § 105-1613.
56. Intervention allowed in attachment proceedings under a general statute: Dennis
v. Kohm, 131 Cal. 91, 63 Pac. 141 (1900); Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Runkel, 16 Idaho 192,
101 Pac. 396 (1909) ; Lee v. Bradlee, 8 Mart. 20 (La. 1820) ; Houston Real Estate Invest-
ment Co. v. Hechler, 44 Utah 64, 138 Pac. 1159 (1914); Note (1911) 18 ANat. CAS, 594.
Note (1910) 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 536; Sunderland, loc. cit. supra note 54.
The following states have specific statutes allowing intervention in attachment, and execu-
tion proceedings, and in replevin: ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 10375 (attachment
and execution), § 7403 (detinue) ; ARiz. REv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4368 (attach-
ment, execution and replevin) ; ARK. CIV. CODE (Crawford, 1934) § 257 (attachment), § 727
(execution), § 213 (replevin); CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. (Deering, 1931) § 549 (attachment),
§ 649 (execution); CoLo. CODE CIv. Paoc. ANNt. (Mills, 1933) § 112 (attachment), § 94
(replevin); GA. CODE (1933) § 8-801 (attachment), § 39-801 (execution); ILL. REv. STAT.
(Cahill & Moore, 1935) c. 11 § 29 (attachment), c. 119 § 22(1) (replevin); IOWA CODE
(1931) H8 12136 and 12137 (attachment), § 12180 (replevin); KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923)
§ 60-421 (attachment), § 60-419 (execution); KY. Civ. CODE PRAc. (Carroll, 1927) § 29
(attachment, execution and replevin) ; LA. CODE PRAc. (Dart, 1932) arts. 395-403 (attach-
ment and execution); MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 9 § 47 (attachment and execu-
tion); Miss. CODE ANN. (1930) §§ 3424-3426 (attachment and execution) §§ 3102, 3103
(replevin); Mo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932) § 1325 (attachment), § 1184 (execution); N. M.
STAT. ANN. (Courttight, 1929) § 105-1613 (attachment), § 105-1703 (replevin); N. C.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) § 829 (attachment), § 840 (claim and delivery); ORLA. STAT.
ANN. (Harlow, 1931) § 162 (attachment); ORE. LAWS (1931) 244, amending Ore. Code Ann.
(1930) §§ 3-301, 4-413 (attachment and execution); VA. CODE (Michle, 1930) § 6407
(attachment); §§ 5798-5800 (detinue); WAsH. Rxv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 573
(attachment and execution); W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) § 38-7-41 (attachment).
Intervention allowed in attachment proceedings by judicial decision: Dreyfus v. Mayer,
69 Miss. 282, 12 So. 267 (1891); Sims v. Goettle, 82 N. C. 268 (1880). Contra: Partridge v.
Marston, 127 Me. 380, 143 Atl. 599 (1928).
Replevin, being a suit for the recovery of specific personal property, falls within the
embrace of both the narrow and broad intervention statutes. Rosenberg v. Salomon, 144
N. Y. 92, 38 N. E. 982 (1894) (intervention allowed under the narrow type statute).
57. Cushing v. Levi, 117 Cal. App. 94, 3 P. (2d) 958 (1931) (specific performance);
Knotts v. Tuxbury, 69 Ind. App. 248, 117 N. E. 282 (1917) (quiet title); Baca v. Anaya,
14 N. M. 382, 94 Pac. 1017 (1908), 20 Ann. Cas. 82 (1911) (partition); Ladd v. Steven-
son, 112 N. Y. 325, 19 N. E. 842 (1889) (lienholder); Mandel v. Guardian Holding Co.,
192 App. Div. 391, 182 N. Y. Supp. 686 (1st Dept. 1920) (specific performance); and
cases cited, supra note 56.
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or distribution;I s a person inadequately represented by a party before
the court who purports to represent him;rt9 a person in privity with a
party, as a purchaser of an interest in property pendente lite;cO one who
may be bound to satisfy a judgment, as a principal or surety;0 the
attorney-general in a suit involving a charitable trust; 2 a co-respondent
or an officer representing the state in a divorce case;63 a subrogee.0 '
The tendency towards an extensive use of the allowance of intervention
seems advantageous. 5
STATUTES AND RULES GOVERNING FEDERAL INTERVENTION
At the present time intervention in the federal courts is governed by
Admiralty Rules 3427 and 42,- by Equity Rule 37,0 and by the Con-
58. Receivership: Barnes v. Commercial Credit Co., 161 Ga. 605, 131 S. E. 476 (1926);
Continental Trust Co. v. Sabine Basket Co., 165 Ga. 591, 141 S. E. 664 (1928); State v.
Farmer's State Bank, 103 Neb. 194, 170 N. W. 901 (1919).
Administration of trusts and decedent's estates: Awbrey v. Estes, 216 Ala. 66, 112 So.
529 (1927); Doke v. Williams, 45 Fla. 248, 34 So. 569 (1903); Thorne v. State Ban:, 193
Wis. 97, 213 N. W. 646 (1927).
Fund in court for distribution as in interpleader cases: Van Orden v. Golden West Adjust-
ment Co., 9 P. (2d) 572 (Cal. App. 1932); Rutherford v. Union Land and Cattle Co., 47
Nev. 21, 213 Pac. 1045 (1923).
59. Stockholders: Crowe v. Hamilton National Bank, 74 Colo. 407, 222 Pac. 394 (1924);
Conlee v. Clay City, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 533, 102 S. W. 862 (1907); Kerr v. Southwest Fluorite
Co., 35 N. M. 232, 294 Pac. 324 (1930); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. The N. Y. &
Northern Ry. Co., 150 N. Y. 410, 44 N. E. 1043 (1896).
Bondholder: Walpole v. Rogers, 66 Colo. 583, 185 Pac. 346 (1919).
Taxpayer: Davis v. Warde, 155 Ga. 748, 118 S. E. 378 (1923); Greecy v. County of
Lion, 40 Iowa 72 (1874); Tyree v. Road District No. 5, 199 S. W. 644 (Tem. Civ. App.
1917); Note Ann. Cas. 1913C 911.
Consumers in Public Utility Rate Cases: State v. Tidball, 35 Wyo. 496, 252 Pac. 499
(1927). Contra: City of Grand Rapids v. Consumers Power Co., 216 Mich. 409, 185 N. W.
852 (1921).
60. Loughborough v. McNevin, 74 Cal. 250, 14 Pac. 369 (1887); Walker v. Sanders, 103
Minn. 124, 114 N. W. 649, 123 Am. St. Rep. 276 (1908).
61. Empson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 71 Colo. 282, 206 Pac. 378 (1922); Price
v. Carlton, 121 Ga. 12, 48 S. E. 721 (1904); Stratford Arms Hotel Co. v. General Casualty
& Surety Co., 249 Mich. 518, 229 N. W. 506 (1930); Feinberg v. American Surety Co., 33
Misc. 458, 67 N. Y. Supp. 868 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
62. See In re McClellan's Estate, 27 S. D. 109, 129 N. W. 1037 (1911), Ann. Cas. 1913C
1035.
63. Shaw v. Shaw, 156 App. Div. 379, 141 N. Y. Supp. 425 (2d Dept. 1913); Ria v.
RLxa, 35 Misc. 227, 71 N. Y. Supp. 815 (Sup. Ct. 1901) (permitted by statute). In the
absence of statute the weight of authority is against allowing intervention. Howell v.
Howell, 87 Kan. 389, 124 Pac. 168 (1912), Ann Cas. 1913E 429. A third person has been
allowed to intervene to secure specific performance of a land contract by one of the parties
to a divorce proceeding. Gorman v. Gorman, 158 La. 274, 103 So. 766 (1925).
64. Dobson v. Southern Ry. Co., 129 N. C. 289, 40 S. E. 42 (1901); Schnick v. Morris,
24 S. W. (2d) 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
65. CLARIC, CODE PLEADING (1928) 289-290.
66. U. S. RL-. STAT. § 913 (1878), 28 U. S. C. A. § 723 (1926); Equity Rule, 37, adopted
in 1912.
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formity Act,"7 which applies the state practice to law actions. It is
arguable that intervention practice was expanded by the Law and Equity
Act of 1915.08 Aside from admiralty cases, reference is usually made to
Equity Rule 37 which states: "Any one claiming an interest in the litiga-
tion may at any time be permitted to intervene to assert his right by in-
tervention, but the intervention shall be in subordination to and in recogni-
tion of the main proceedings." The problem of intervention in the federal
courts is complicated because of the existence of not one but in effect
many rules. Equity Rule 37 will govern if intervention is sought in
an equity suit, and the state law, given effect by the Conformity Act,
should govern the allowance of intervention to present a legal claim or
defense in a law action. But a court in allowing such intervention in a
law action may be tempted to term the intervention an ancillary bill in
equity. 9 This has resulted in some confusion and discussion as to
whether intervention is legal or equitable. 0 It is to be noted that in
these cases the intervenor does not intend to urge an equitable claim or
defense in the law action; his claim or defense is legal; the question con-
cerns only the nature of his right to present his legal claim or defense.
67. 17 STAT. 196 (1872), 28 U. S. C. A. § 724 (1926). Many of the intervention cases
involve attachment or execution; conformity to the state practice is achieved by §§ 915
and 916 of the Revised Statutes.
68. March 3, 1915, c. 90, 38 STAT. 956, 28 U. S. C. A. § 398 (1926), § 274-b Jud, Code.
This permits equitable defenses and equitable relief in actions at law. See Clark and Moore,
A New Federal Civil Procedure I, The Background, (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 387, 424 et seq.
For discussion of federal intervention see Eliot, Interventions in the Federal Courts (1897)
31 Am. L. REv. 377; Hersman, Intervention in Federal Courts (1927) 61 Am. L. Rrv. 1,
161; Wham, Intervention in Federal Equity Cases (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 160; Note (1931)
31 CoL. L. REV. 1312; CLARx, RtcEivERs (2d ed. 1929) c. XVIII; 2 FosiTE, FEDEaRAL PRAc-
TicE (6th ed. 1920) c. XVII; HurHEs, FEDr.AL PRAcricEc (1931) §§ 679, 696-700, 734, 1197-
1201, 1218-1220, 1243, 4313-4319; SImHIs, FEDERAL PRACTicE (1934) §§ 24, 715 et seq.;
WiLLiAms, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE (2d ed. 1927) 408-417.
69. See the discussion in Freeman v. Howe, 65 U. S. 450, 460 (1860). The dictum In
Freeman v. Howe was said to justify intervention in an incidental legal action in the
similar case of Gumbel v. Pitkin, 113 U. S. 545, 547 (1885), where the claimant of a prior
lien was allowed to intervene in an attachment proceeding. In Gumbel v. Pitkin, however,
the state law would have allowed intervention.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized intervention in incidental legal pro-
ceedings where the intervenor claims a legal interest and intervention would be allowed by
the applicable state practice. In addition to Gumbel v. Pitkin, already referred to, there
is the case of New Orleans v. Louisiana Construction Co., 129 U .S. 45 (1889), where
the city of New Orleans was allowed to intervene in an execution sale proceeding; Louisiana
practice allowed such intervention. In Barrett v. Commercial Credit Co., 296 Fed. 996
(App. D. C. 1924), intervention in a replevin action was allowed.
70. It may be pointed out that the Supreme Court in the famous case of Krippendorf
v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276, 286 (1884), while professing to maintain a strict distinction between
law and equity, allowed a bill in equity to result in what the court called "an ancillary and
dependent bill, equivalent in effect and purpose to a petition in the attachment proceeding
itself". It thus allowed a bill in equity to result in intervention in an incidental legal pro-
ceeding.
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Further difficulty arises when the intervenor attempts to set forth an
equitable claim or defense in a law action. Although present federal
practice, subsequent to the Law and Equity Act of 1915, allows a de-
fendant to set forth an equitable defense or counterclaim in a law
action, 1 no authority appears for allowing an intervenor to set forth
an equitable defense or counterclaim.7" It could be argued that once
an intervenor has been allowed to become a party defendant, he should
be treated as to his status in all respects like an original party and
hence be held to be within the Law and Equity Act. As will be noted
later, however, this argument is too broad, for an intervenor, even though
he has become a party, plaintiff or defendant, has restricted rights.a
If the intervenor cannot invoke the Law and Equity Act, he has no
statute or federal rule to support his raising equitable issues in a law
action.74 It is perfectly possible, however, for the court to treat the
equitable claim as though it were an ancillary bill in equity, dependent
71. Supra note 68.
72. See Allington v. Shevlin-Hixon Co., 2 F. (2d) 747, 749 (D. Del. 1924).
73. His rights of counterclaim are restricted. Chandler & Price Co. v. Brandtjen &
Kluge, Inc., 56 Sup. Ct. 6 (1935). Apparently the issue as to venue may be different for him
than for an original defendant, and the subordination rule materially cuts down defen-se
that he may present. The rule that a court of equity will retain jurisdiction to do justice
between the parties has been said to be non-applicable to an intervenor. Bache v. Hinde,
6 F. (2d) 508 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925).
74. As a matter of fact, most of the cases cited as not allowing intervention at law are
actually concerned with not allowing an intervenor to present an equitable claim in a legal
action. Thus McKemy v. Supreme Lodge A. 0. U. W., ISO Fed. 961, 965, 966 (C. C. A.
6th, 1910) was a case where the receiver of a grand lodge of a beneficial association brought
an action at law to recover from the Supreme Lodge unpaid benefit claims out of a guaranty
fund which the laws of the order required the Supreme Lodge to keep intact. Two bene-
ficiaries holding certificates issued by the Grand Lodge were permitted to intervene on
behalf of themselves and others so situated. The court sustained a demurrer to the petition
on the ground that it did not state a cause of action at law inasmuch as the Supreme Lodge
was in the position of a trustee of a guaranty fund and could exercise honest discretion as
to whether it would pay. The claim of the intervenors under this theory vas therefore
an equitable claim. The court does not seem to have been very clear as to what the nature
of the right to intervene was, but it was bothered by the idea of injecting an equitable claim
into a law action, and it evidently jumped to the conclusion that all interventions are for
that purpose. Similarly in Gravenberg v. Laws, 100 Fed. 1, 7 (C. C. A. Sth, 190o), inter-
vention was denied in a legal action to persons claiming equitable right, although the
Louisiana statute would have allowed such intervention had this been a state court. The
court dismissed the petition without prejudice and indicated that it would allow it if pre-
sented as an ancillary bill in equity. See Clarke v. Eureka County Bank, 116 Fed. 534,
537 (C. C. D. Nev. 1902) (decided on other issues). The McKcmy and Greverberg cases
and the dictum in the Clarke case were sound under practice then prevailing previous to the
Law and Equity Act of 1915. They are supportable today insofar as it is held that an
intervenor cannot take advantage of the Law and Equity Act, and insofar as a court may
refuse to treat these petitions as ancillary bills in equity. But these cases will be obsolete
if the new procedure rules for the federal district courts unite law and equity.
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upon the main action as to jurisdiction, but independent in other respects,
as in appellate review. 75 This problem will become purely academic
when law and equity are united under the new rules."'
The statutes and rules applicable to intervention in the federal courts
have been applied or augmented by a great many decisions. In some
cases the development has been such as would not be expected from a
reading of Equity Rule 37. But the trend of the decisions is at least
apparent in most instances, and it is, therefore, possible to state with
some degree of certainty the federal practice on intervention.
RIGHT TO INTERVENE
It is convenient and theoretically sound to distinguish between the
right to intervene and the rights of the intervenor, or, in other words,
to distinguish the question as to when intervention is allowable from
the question as to what the intervenor can do after he has intervened.
The courts do not always recognize this distinction; instead they often,
consider the question of what the intervenor can do without deciding
whether he has a right to intervene at all.71  No particular criticism
of this practice is intended. Indeed, were it not for the fact that almost
inevitably when a court proceeds in this manner it decides that the
intervenor has no claim,71 the practice might be defended as an effort
of the courts to consider all possible rights. In the present discussion,
however, the distinction is made. We consider first, theref6re, the right
to intervene, and later, the status of the intervenior.
75. In McDelrmott v. Hayes, 197 Fed. 129 (C. C. A. 1st, 1912), the court treated Inter-
vention in a law suit to present an equitalle claim as an ancillary equitable proceeding.
But the court in Austin Machinery Co. of Va. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 67 F. (2d) 775,
776 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933) refused to do this, because this "would have permitted a stranger
to convert a law cause into an entirely new suit in equity, wherein the petition would
have lost the feature of intervention altogether and would have served as an original bill
in equity." But the case arose in Tennessee which had no statute allowing intervention
at law.
Ordinarily the appeal will follow the procedure set for the main suit. Rouse v. Letcher,
156 U. S. 47 (1895); Bogg v. New York City, 262 U. S. 196 (1923).
76. 48 STAT. 1064, 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 723-b, 723-c (1934).
77. In Jameson v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 20 F. (2d) 808 (C. C. A. 7th,
1927); cert. denied, 275 U. S. 569 (1927). Palmer v. Bankers' Trust Co,, 12 F. (2d) 747
(C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co.,
52 F. (2d) 418 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931); Clark v. Young, 31 F. (2d) 227 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929).
It is sometimes impossible for the appellate court to determine whether the trial court
granted or denied intervention. This was the case in First Federal Trust Co. v. First National
Bank of San Francisco, 297 Fed. 353 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924), where the appellate court allowed
creditors to intervene in a receivership, but was unable to determine whether the trial court
had already allowed them to intervene.
78. As, for instance, in Lincoln Printing Co. v. Middle West Utilities Co., 74 F. (2d)
779 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).
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The right to intervene seems to be of two types: absolute, and dis-
cretionary." The absolute right exists when the petitioner claims an
interest in property in the hands of the court,"0 or when the petitioner
is inadequately represented in an action controlled by the court and
in which a decision will be binding upon the petitioner.8 ' The discre-
tionary right to intervene exists when the petitioner has an interest in
a question of law and fact common to the pending litigation.P The
discretionary right is a matter of trial convenience.ea The absolute
right is given as a protection to the petitioner. Equity Rule 37 makes
no such distinction. It speaks in the language of permission for all
intervenors. "Any one claiming an interest in the litigation may at any
time be permitted to intervene." But the courts do make the distinction,
although they are more apt to talk in terms of abuse of discretion than
in terms of absolute right."4 In referring to that large class of cases
in which permission to intervene must be granted and where denial
thereof is always an abuse of discretion, it seems artificial to talk in
terms of discretion, the right being, rather, absolute.
The main practical difference between absolute and discretionary rights
of intervention is that only in the absolute type, will an appeal lie from the
order refusing intervention," and there need be no independent ground
79. Whatever objection there may be to classifying rights into absolute or dtcretion.
ary when substantive law is dealt with, it would seem that for procedural purpos2 the
classification is justifiable.
80. Credits Commutation Co. v. United States, 177 U. S. 311, 315 (1900). See the dib-
cussion in Minot v. Mastin, 95 Fed. 734, 739 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899); Clarke v. Eureka County
Bank, 116 Fed. 534, 536 (C. C. D. Nev. 1902); Demulso Corporation v. Tretolite Co., 74
F. (2d) 805, 807 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934). But the absolute right to intervene is Eometimes
so phrased as to make it appear that no absolute 'ight wil be given if any other avenue of
redress is open to the attempted intervenor. United States Trust Co. of New TYork v. Chicago
Terminal Transfer Ry. Co., 188 Fed. 292 (C. C. A. 7th, 1911).
81. Central Trust Co. of New York v. Chicago R. I. & P. Rr. Co., 218 Fed. 336, 339
(C. C. A. 2d, 1914).
82. It is usually stated that a petitioner for intervention must have some legal interest
in the subject matter of the suit. Glass v. Woodman, 223 Fed. 621 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915).
"The general rule is that a person not a party to a suit cannot appear in it, and be admitted
to defend against it, except on the ground that he has an interest in the results of the litiga-
tion of a direct and immediate character." Lombard Investment Co. v. Seabord Manufactur-
ing Co., 74 Fed. 325, 326 (C. C. S. D. Ala. 1896).
83. Intervention as a discretionary matter is allowed on the theory that the intecvenor
would be a proper party. See Brinckerhoff v. Holland Trust Co., 159 Fed. 191 (C. C. S.
D. N. Y. 1908).
84. Palmer v. Bankers Trust Co., 12 F. (2d) 747, 752 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); cf. United
States Casualty Co. v. Taylor, 64 F. (2d) 521, 526 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933); State of North
Carolina v. Southern Ry. Co., 30 F. (2d) 204, 209 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
85. United States v. Philips, Judge, 107 Fed. 824 (C. C. A. 8th, 1901); United States
Trust Co. of New York v. Chicago Terminal Transfer Rr. Co., 188 Fed. 292 (C. C. A. 7th,
1911); Burrow v. Citizens' State Bank, 74 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. Sth, 1935).
In United States v. Philips, Judge, 107 Fed. 824, 825 (C. C. A. 8th, 1901) the suggestion
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of federal jurisdiction."" A holding by a court that the petitioner has
a right to appeal such an order is always a holding that the petitioner's
right of intervention is absolute."7 Further, although there is a conflict
on the point, one line of cases holds that an independent ground of
federal jurisdiction must exist where the right to intervene is discretionary.
Thus, where federal jutrisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, a
petitioner who lacks the requisite diversity will be allowed to intervene
only if he has an absolute right to do so.88 And as we shall later suggest,
the nature of the petitioner's right to intervene may affect his status
after he has intervened.
I. The Absolute Right to Intervene
A. Based on Property in the Control of the Courts
The historic intervention practice of examination pro interesse suo
with which we have dealt is the foundation for the absolute right to
intervene, either in the main or incidental proceedings, where the inter-
venor claims an interest in property subject to the control of a court.
Intervention may here be justified even though the court's jurisdiction
over the property be not truly in rem, its action being incapable of cutting
off the rights of one not a party, and even though remedies other than
intervention may be available."' It is important to stress the latter
because some courts tend to regard the absolute right to intervene as
dependent upon the non-existence of other means of redress. But since
a third person's rights are apt to be seriously jeopardized in all these
cases, and may be cut off in some, the remedy of intervention is clearly
necessary to prevent the court's processes from injuring his rights.
The Interest of the Petitioner
What kind of an interest must a petitioner have in property subject
to the control of a court before he can claim an absolute right to inter-
vene? Obviously it must be an interest known and protected by the
law: a claim of ownership, or a lesser interest, sufficient and of the
is made that the trial court should allow an appeal to all would-be intervenors as a matter
of course, for "if a mistake is made by the lower court as to the character of the Inter-
vention, and the chancellor refuses an appeal, the intervenor is entirely without a remedy."
86. Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276 (1884); Lackner v. McKechney, 252 Fed. 403
(C. C. A. 7th, 1918). The subject will be further discussed later in these articles.
87. The reasoning here is circular. But reasoning is always circular when a right is
identified by its necessary incidents.
88. Fulton Bank v. Hozier, 267 U. S. 276 (1925); Cochrane v. W. F. Potts Son & Co.,
47 F. (2d) 1026 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931). But see Drumright v. Texas Sugadland Co., 16 F. (2d)
657 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927) cert. denied, 274 U. S. 749 (1929). The subject will be further
discussed in these articles.
89. Rhinehart v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 261 Fed. 646, 651 (D. N. J. 1917).
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type to be denominated a lien, equitable or legal.0 It is "not always
easy to draw the line"'" as to when an interest is sufficient to give a
lien for this purpose; but the tendency of the cases is apparently towards
a liberal definition of ownership and lien.
An absolute right to intervene runs to a claimant of attached property,
or the proceeds thereof,92 to the part owner of mortgaged personal prop-
erty being foreclosed, 3 to the purchaser of land from the defendant in
a foreclosure action,94 to the mortgagee of a leasehold interest sought to
be forfeited."a On the other hand it has been held that one claiming as
owner of land upon which execution has issued and leyy and sale been
had, has no absolute right to intervene, his remedy being by a bill to
quiet title, or by defending in an action for possession based upon the
execution sale. 6 But in view of the development noted above, where
the absolute right of intervention is given despite the presence of other
possible remedies, the latter result seems questionable.
In the above cases the claim is that of the owner, the part owner, the
lessee, or the mortgagee, and constitutes a fairly well defined claim,
arising from transactions commonly used to create property interests.
90. The Supreme Court has indicated that an "inchoate lien" would be sufficient. In a
suit for accounting of property received in settlement of certain mining suits, the petitioner
was allowed to intervene to prove his claim to the "fund" on the basis of a contingent
fee. Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U. S. 117, 123 (1914). Where intervention is discretionary
there need be no lien; the possibility of direct gain or loss in a legal interest is sufficient.
United States Casualty Co. v. Taylor, 64 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933).
91. United States v. Radice, 40 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1930), vhere a mortgagee of
a leasehold interest was said to have an absolute right to intervene in a cross-suit by the
owner of property to forfeit the lease. Judge Swan pointed out that intervention could b2
allowed as an absolute right here if the district court had the required jurisdiction, even
though other remedies might be available to the petitioner.
92. Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276 (1884). Although the court did not seem to b2
sure what form the intervention should take, it was sure that the petitioner could claim the
right of intervention because he had an interest in property controlled by the court.
93. Osborne & Co. v. Barge, 30 Fed. 805 (C. C. N. D. Iowa, 1887).
94. Gaines v. Clark, 275 Fed. 1017, 1019 (App. D. C. 1921).
95. United States v. Radice, 40 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930). The United States
brought an action to abate a nuisance against the owner and tenant. The owner Med a
cross-bill to forfeit the lessee's leasehold. The court ordered the lease forfeited and the
lessee appealed. After the forfeiture decree, the mortgagee of the leasehold interest petitioned
for leave to intervene. The trial court denied the petition after the appeal to the appellate
court had been perfected. The appellate court held that, although in the instant case
the district court was without jurisdiction to pass on the petition for intervention, the
appeal having already been argued at the time the petition was filed, nevertheles-s, in cases
where it had jurisdiction, the intervention would have to be allowed.
96. Ex parte Mensing, 55 Fed. 17 (C. C. D. S. C. 1893). There was no privity between
the petitioner and the defendant in the execution, and there was an action at law pending be-
tween the purchaser at the sale under execution and the petitioner. The lack of privity would
seem immaterial. The pending suit might be a reason for denying intervention in a given case.
See Connor v. Peugh's Lessee, 18 How. 394 (U. S. 1855).
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But in another class of cases the petitioner's interest arises from an
atypical transaction, and the lien, if any, depends upon equitable con-
siderations. Thus, Indiana in building the Wabash & Erie Canal incurred
certain indebtedness to Robertson for the performance of work on the
canal, and to Johns for the destruction of his water right. It was
agreed that an amount of money should be payable to Robertson out
of rent received through the operation of the canal, and that Johns
should be furnished a certain amount of water, rent free. Later, the
state, to meet the expense of building the canal, issued certificates of
indebtedness. The holders of these certificates having brought a bill
in equity which resulted in a sale of the canal, it was held that persons
in the position of Robertson and Johns had an absolute right to intervene
in the equity proceedings.97 The lessor of a non-assignable lease, who
alleged that he was owed a sizable amount for maintenance of the leased
railroad, was held to have an absolute right to intervene in receivership
proceedings, because the receiver had sold the lease and, furthermore,
had made no provision for preferring the debt incurred by maintenance 8
A petitioner claiming a contingent fee was said to have a like right of
intervention in an accounting suit upon the theory of a lien on the fund
in court. 9 In a suit by creditors to obtain payment from a trust fund,
other creditors claiming an interest in this same fund, insufficient to
pay all creditors fully, had an absolute right to intervene. 100
A more complete picture of the interest required for this type of
intervention is given by a consideration of those cases where the interest
was held to be insufficient to sustain an absolute right of intervention.
A lessor does not have a sufficient interest in the property of his lessee
to sustain an absolute right to intervene in the general receivership
of the lessee. On the other hand, the New York City Railway Company
was allowed to intervene in the receivership of its lessee and, in fact,
have the receivership extended to it, but on the theory that it was
"within the discretion of the [trial] court."''1 The same theory was
approved in Board of Commissioners of Sweetwater County, Wyo. v.
Bernardin,°2 but with a difference in result. The lease here being sub-
97. French v. Gapen, 105 U. S. 509 (1881). No exception was taken by any of the
parties to the plea for intervention.
98. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co. v. Schaff, 5 F. (2d) 610, 611 (C. C. A. Sth, 1925): "In-
tervener might establish his claim to damages by a suit at law and in some other court, but
it is not probable there would be any personal liability of the receiver, and in the last
analysis recovery would have to be out of the assets of the receivership."
99. Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U. S. 117 (1914). The problem before the court was
whether it was proper for the trial court to have allowed intervention; but the Supreme
Court talked in terms of an absolute right.
100. Carter v. City of New Orleans, 19 Fed. 659 (C. C. E. D. La. 1884).
101. In re Metropolitan Ry. Receivership, 208 U. S. 90, 111 (1908).
102. 74 F. (2d) 809 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934), cert. denied, 55 Sup. Ct, 845 (1935).
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ject to forfeiture if taxes were unpaid, the lessors contended that they
had an absolute right to intervene on the question of the priority of
tax payments, in order to safeguard their interests. This contention
was rejected, and the right, if any, of the petitioner held discretionary;
so that the order of the trial court refusing intervention was non-review-
able. If the lessor has an insufficient interest in the property of his lessee
to justify the absolute right to intervene in a receivership of the lessee,
we may expect that a simple creditor of a party to a legal proceeding
will not be given that absolute right unless more can be shown. Thus, the
creditor of foreclosing bondholders had no absolute right to intervene in a
foreclosure suit brought by the bondholders, when the creditor's claim
appeared to have no relation to the suit.
0 3
Patent infringement cases present an interesting phase of the inter-
vention problem. In most instances the manufacturer has probably
agreed to protect his buyer from patent suits; and in all events, the
outcome of the litigation is likely to affect the economic interest of the
manufacturer more than the buyer. The buyer is apt to conclude that
it will be cheaper for him to agree to buy the product from the plaintiff
in the future in return for a consent decree letting him off with no
liability and less bother in the present case. Yet it is difficult to see
how the manufacturer can be said to have any interest approximating
a lien on property in the hands of the court in such a case. Accordingly,
in Demulso Corp. v. Tretolite Co.,10 4 where the trial court denied the
manufacturer the right to intervene in a patent infringement suit against
the dealer, the appellate court held that no appeal would lie from the
order inasmuch as the petitioner had only an "indirect" interest in the
res in the hands of the court. Realizing, however, the dilemma in which
the decision would place the manufacturer, the court suggested that if
another such patent suit were brought against any of his dealers the
trial court in its discretion might allow intervention. Similarly, one
court,'0° while denying the absolute right, made the suggestion that
where the suing patentee knows that the manufacturer is paying for the
defense of the suit, the manufacturer ought to be considered a party.
Apparently the court premised this suggestion not on a theory of inter-
vention but on the theory that the manufacturer was the real party
in interest. The difficulty with that theory is that the manufacturer's
liability is separate from and in addition to the liability of the dealer,
103. Glass v. Woodman, 223 Fed. 621 (C. C. A. Sth, 1915). The appellate court affirmed
the order denying intervention. Actually it would seem that since there was no absolute
right to intervention, and no appeal lay, the appeal should have been dismhred.
104. 74 F. (2d) 805, 808 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934). The day after the petition for inter-
vention was filed a consent decree was entered.
105. Foote v. Parsons Non-Skid Co., 196 Fed. 951 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912). Thee was
a consent decree in the main action.
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and the court's concept of the real party in interest has been recently
repudiated by the Supreme Court."°0 On the other hand, no logical or
practical reason appears for basing the intervenor's absolute right on
the plaintiff's knowledge as to the person bearing the expenses of the
defense.
On the theory of the patent cases, the insurer has no absolute right
to intervene when claimants of workmen's compensation sue to restrain
a commissioner from enforcing his order denying recovery on insurance
policies. For, the insurer can show no lien, and although it bears the
financial risk, it is unable to claim that it is the real party in interest,107
since the right asserted by the workman is against the commissioner.
But a trial court, exercising sound discretion, may allow intervention
on grounds of administrative convenience. 00
On the theory that the receiver is merely the custodian of property
and does not represent the parties, he has no absolute right to intervene
in a suit to establish a lien or claim against that property. Thus, the
receiver of a drainage district could not intervene in a suit against the
district on bonds which it had issued.' The court in its discretion,
however, often will allow intervention.1 0 The position of the receiver
in these cases should be contrasted with his position in cases where stock-
holders wish to intervene in a receivership and the right is denied them
on the grounds that they are sufficiently represented by the receiver.'
106. Chandler & Price Co. v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 56 Sup. Ct. 6 (1935).
107. United States Casualty Co. v. Taylor, 64 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933), cert.
denied, 290 U. S. 639 (1933). Intervention was allowed here after the final decree.
108. In United States Casualty Co. v. Taylor, 64 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933), the
insurance company had been a party in the hearing before the commissioner. But it would
seem that the fact that the petitioner had been a party to a prior administrative hearing with
the plaintiff will not of itself give the petitioner an absolute right of intervention in the
present proceeding. In Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 760,
763 (1931), the Kansas City Southern Ry. Company brought the suit to set aside two
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The right to bring the suit was attacked
on the basis that the Louisville & Nashville Rr. Co. was also attacking the orders of the
Commission in an earlier suit, and that inasmuch as both of the railways had been parties
to the hearings of the Commission at which the orders were made, the Kansas Railway
had an absolute right to intervene in the suit by the Louisville Co. and should be required
to do so rather than to bring a separate suit of its own. The court neverthelesM allowed
the separate suit, but stated ". . . the appellants, upon proper application could have been
allowed to intervene in the earlier suit brought for the same purpose." But it would seem
that the right to intervene in such a case would be discretionary rather than absolute.
109. Board of Drainage Commissioners of Fender County Drainage District No. 4 v.
La Fayette Southside Bank of St. Louis, 27 F. (2d) 286 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928).
110. In Perry v. Godbe, 82 Fed. 141 (C. C. D. Nev. 1897), the receiver of the cor-
poration's property was allowed to intervene in order to contest plaintiff's efforts to estab-
lish an equitable lien on that property. The parties to the suit were said to have waived
their right to object to intervention by not making any objections when the petition for
intervention was filed, but, instead, filing a replication to it. See First Trust Co. v. Illinois
Central Rr. Co., 252 Fed. 965 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918), cert. denied, 249 U. S. 615 (1919).
111. See infra note 189.
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It should be contrasted also with the position of a trustee in bankruptcy
who has an absolute right to intervene in state court proceedings insti-
tuted by lien creditors more than four months before the bankruptcy.1'
There seems to be no adequate reason for any differentiation and the
theory underlying the stockholder-bankruptcy cases seems the sounder.
When a creditor brings an individual action against a debtor, another
creditor will not have an absolute right to intervene. 13 To hold other-
wise would be to abandon completely the general notion that a plaintiff
may control his action and that an unrepresented petitioner must show
a lien interest to support an absolute right of intervention. Even if
the suit brought by the creditor is a class action, a third person without
showing more than that he is a creditor may be denied the right to
intervene as a general party unless he agrees to pay a ratable portion
of the expenses and to be represented by the plaintiff's attorney'1
Similarly a mere stockholder has no absolute right to intervene in an
individual stockholder's action,"' nor in a stockholder's class suit, save
on such terms as may reasonably be set by the court.'
Up to now we have been dealing with cases which have attempted to
define "lien" for purposes of intervention. Where a legal interest in
property is lacking, there can be no lien, and hence no absolute right
to intervene. Moreover, in some cases, there would seem to be no
basis even for a discretionary right to intervene, there being no question
of law or fact common to petitioner's claim and the pending litigation.
Thus, in a suit by a power company to review an order of the Federal
Power Commission denying permission to build a dam, an iron company
had no right to intervene merely because it transported material on the
river where the dam was to be constructed." 7 The court in denying
intervention stated: "It is well settled that the only interest which will
112. Straton v. New, 283 U. S. 31S (1931).
113. Rhoades v. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance on Lives & Granting Annuities, 93 Fed.
533 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1899). The plaintiff's claim was adjusted before intervention was
attempted.
114. Mlyers v. Fenn, 5 Wall. 205, 207 (U. S. 1866). Judgment creditors joined with the
plaintiff without any order of court in a creditors' bill charging fraudulent transfer
of property. "The practice of permitting judgment Creditors to come in and make them-
selves parties to the bill, and thereby obtain the benefit, assuming at the ame time their
portion of the costs and expenses of the litigation is well settled?' See Bowker v. Haight and
Freese Co., 140 Fed. 794 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1905), where, although intervention was allowed,
the court evidently did not regard it as a case of absolute right.
115. Jackson Co. v. Gardiner Inv. Co., 200 Fed. 113, 117 (C. C. A. 1st, 1912).
116. Elder v. Western, Mining Co., 280 Fed. 569 (C. C. A. Sth, 1922). The court dis-
regarded, however, the question as to whether stockholders were adequately represented by
directors and officers.
117. Radford Iron Co. v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 62 F. (2d) 940 (C. C. A.
4th, 1933), cert. denied, 289 U. S. 748 (1933). The appeal was not dismiL-ed, but the order
denying intervention was affirmed. The iron company owned no property on the river.
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entitle a person to the right of intervention in a case is a legal interest
as distinguished from interests of a general and indefinite character
which do not give rise to definite legal rights." 118  The City of New
York was likewise unable to intervene in a suit by the Gas Company
against the Attorney General of New York, the District Attorney of
the County of New York and the Public Service Commissioner in
order to have the 90-cent gas law declared unconstitutional.11 The
city was not legally affected in its corporate capacity because it got
its gas at 75 cents per cubic foot under another section of the law not
under attack, and, because of the character of the parties defendant,
there was no need for it to intervene to protect the interests of its
residents. And it is not sufficient justification for an absolute right of
interventibn in a proceeding brought to dissolve a tobacco combination,
found to have violated the anti-trust laws, that the would-be intervenor
is a combination of concerns selling leaf tobacco and is vitally interested
in the dissolution to be effected. 20
Court Control of Property
How have the courts developed the dual concept of control and
property so that ownership of or a lien interest in property in the control
of the court affords the basis for an absolute right to intervene? In
some cases the emphasis is upon what constitutes control; in others it
is upon the determination of property; but in all cases control and
property are inextricably linked together. The dual concept is developed
in receivership cases, suits to establish or impress a trust, fund cases,
possessory actions, and incidental proceedings such as sequestration and
attachment. A distinction between an interest in property and an interest
in the proceeds of that property has crept in, a distinction, of course,
well known in other fields of the law, but possibly of doubtful utility in
intervention practice.
The element of court control is depicted by a non-typical case.12' A
corporate officer had been a witness but not a party in a case brought
by his corporation for patent infringement. The exhibits in the suit
were impounded in the custody of the clerk of the court. The United
States Attorney subsequently applied for leave of court to use these
118. Id. at 942.
119. City of New York v. Consolidated Gas Co. of New York, 253 U. S. 219 (1920).
120. In the Matter of Leaf Tobacco Board of Trade of the City of New York, 222 U, S,
578 (1911), a writ of mandamus to compel the circuit court to allow intervention was
denied. Cf. Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca Cola Co., 269 Fed. 796 (D. Del. 1920).
121. Perlman v. United States, 247 U. S. 7 (1918) (decided against the petitioner on the
merits). In Potter v. Beal, 50 Fed. 860 (C. C. A. 1st, 1892), the district attorney was not
allowed to intervene in a suit against the receiver of a bank in order to obtain possession
of private papers fo the purpose of a criminal prosecution.
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impounded exhibits in the prosecution of the officer for perjury, and the
officer petitioned to intervene for the purpose of opposing the application
and to have the documents returned to the corporation. The trial court
denied intervention, but on appeal, the petitioner was held to have an
absolute right to intervene based on his interest in the impounded exhibits.
The more typical cases involve receiverships where both control and
property interest are apparent.. Thus, where a receiver was appointed
on the petition of lien creditors and a sale held, other creditors claiming
liens had an absolute right to come in to establish their claims.Y' In
another receivership, the trial court had denied the trustee under the
mortgage a right to intervene, and the Circuit Court of Appeals, without
bothering to reverse the order of the trial court, proceeded to treat the
trustee as a party and to consider his claim on the merits.' Where a
receiver had been appointed to manage the production of oil and gas,
a petitioner claiming a portion of the production was held to have an
absolute right to intervene. -4 Even in a partnership accounting suit,
where a receiver had been appointed, it was held that petitioners who
claimed the partnership property as mortgage security would have an
absolute right to intervene. 2-
Although it is less easy to find control over property in custodia legis
in the trust cases, here too, the right to intervene is absolute by an
expansion of the concept developed in the receivership cases. Thus, in
a suit to establish a trust in certain securities, the elements of court
control and property interest were said to be sufficient to compel the
court to grant intervention to a third person claiming a trust in the
same securities. 20 If a trust cannot be shown, a favorite device to
support intervention is the fund theory. Here the emphasis shifts to
a determination of whether the court is in possession of property, or
122. Richfield Oil Co. v. Western Machinery Co., 279 Fed. 852 (C. C. A. 9th, 1922).
The same result was reached in Richfield Oil Co. v. Sawtelle, 279 Fed. 851 (C. C. A. 9th,
1921), which is also interesting from a procedural angle in that the Circuit Court of Appeals
felt the trial court should have allowed intervention, but felt unable to do it itself. It chose,
instead to mandamus the district court to allow an appeal from the order denying the peti-
tion for leave to intervene. There seems to be no good reason why intervention cannot be
allowed at the appellate stage, however.
123. First Federal Trust Co. v. First National Bank of San Francisco, 297 Fed. 353
(C. C. A. 9th, 1924). The same court which had felt that it could not allow intervention
directly in Richfield Oil Co. v. Sawtelle, 279 Fed. 351 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921), supra note
122, here in effect reversed its position.
124. Swift v. Black Panther Oil and Gas Co., 244 Fed. 20 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917). The
court distinguished between the absolute right and the discretionary right, although it evi-
dently assumed that in order to have an absolute right, no other remedy must be open to
the petitioner.
125. Minot v. Mastin, 95 Fed. 734 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899). No diversity existed between
the intervenors and their defendants.
126. Leary v. United States, 224 U. S. 567 (1912).
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something less than property. The concept of a fund has been applied
so loosely that it is possible for a court to find a fund in almost any
in personam action. Where a surety sues as assignee of monies due its
principal, a petitioner who claims to have an assignment of a portion
of the 'same monies has been said to have an absolute right to intervene
because of an interest in a "fund" in court.'2 7  Where shippers succeed
in enjoining the enforcement of excessive rates, other shippers, charged
the excessive rate, have an absolute right to intervene because of their
interest in the "fund."' 28  Where is the fund? "In contemplation of
equity, . . . it is the sum total of the excessive rates on lumber, un-
lawfully exacted from the shippers by the combined defendant
companies .. ."129
On the other hand, there are cases taking a more restricted view. A
suit for the construction of the terms of a trust, for instance, has been
held-and it would seem correctly-not to put any property in the
hands of a court so as to give creditors of the beneficiary an absolute
right to intervene.3 1 Or a court may decide that while there is a res,
the petitioner's interest lies elsewhere. Thus where the plaintiff sues
to impress a trust on certain funds, the petitioner gains no absolute
right by showing that he has a similar trust claim, but on other funds
of the defendant.'
In some cases, the interest of the petitioner may be said to be not in
the property before the court, but rather in the proceeds of that property.
One claiming an interest in notes impounded in court had no absolute
right to intervene in a suit to gain possession of the notes, because it
was said that his interest would be in the fund realized when the notes
were paid, and not in the notes themselves.'32 In a similar case, a creditor
127. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. American Surety Co. of New York, 64 F. (2d)
577 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933).
128. Tift v. Southern Ry. Co., 159 Fed. 555 (C. C. S. D. Ga. 1908). The court analogized
the right of the shippers to the historic right to intervene in admiralty practice.
129. 159 Fed. 555, 558 (C. C. S. D. Ga. 1908).
130. Hoffman v. McClelland, 264 U. S. 552 (1924). The question at issue was whether
this was a spendthrift trust. There was no diversity between the creditors and the bene-
ficiary, so that, at least on one theory, a discretionary right of intervention could not be
allowed. Although the creditors urged that the court had taken possession of the trust
res, the court held that it might look at its own records to determine whethe? It had
taken such possession, and found no indication thereof in its records.
131. Bickford's, Inc. v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 5 F. Supp. 875 (S. D. N. Y.
1933). The plaintiff had deposited checks for collection with the Bank of the United States
to be credited to the plaintiff's account. The checks wee sent to the Federal Reserve to be
collected. The latter kept the proceeds when the Bank of the United States closed and
applied the sum to a debt owed to the Federal Reserve by the Bank. Plaintiff sued to en-
force a trust on the proceeds. Although the petitioner alleged identical facts, the court
said the "fund" in which the latter claimed an interest was different, so that, while there
was an interest in the litigation, it was not in the same subject matter.
132. Gregory v. Pike, 67 Fed. 837 (C. C. A. 1st, 1895). An improper cross-bill was
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sought to intervene in a possessory action because he had attached
property as a creditor of one of the litigants. His debtor, the plaintiff,
offered no objection to the attempted intervention, but the court denied
intervention on the theory that the property interest of the petitioner
was in the proceeds which "will result from this suit.")la It is bard
to see how it would have been prejudicial to the parties to have granted
intervention in such a case.' 34
Instead of saying that the petitioner's interest is solely in the proceeds,
the court may deny the absolute right to intervene on the theory that
the petitioner's interest is one step removed, that is, the petitioner's
interest is in an interest in the property. The validity of such a dis-
tinction and its utility seems doubtful. Yet, where a creditor had
attached the equity of redemption-and the assumption, apparently,
was that the equity could be validly attached-it was held that the
creditor could not intervene in the foreclosure proceeding because his
interest was not in the property foreclosed, but solely in the equity of
redemption. Yet the equity of redemption, it would seem, constitutes
a sufficient interest to give to the holder an absolute right to intervene.Y-"'
B. The Absolute Right to Intervene Based on Inadequate
Representation
So far we have been considering the absolute right to intervene based
on an interest in property subject to court control. To deny intervention
in these cases would be injurious to a petitioner, but the judgment would
not be res judicata as to him, unless he were represented in the action
or in privity with a party. On the other hand, where a petitioner is
represented in a proceeding, he will be bound by a decree of the court,
whether he can show an interest in property or not. It, therefore, be-
comes even more important that the right to intervene be absolute if
the representation is shown to be inadequate.
Inadequacy of representation is shown if there is proof of collusion
between the representative and an opposing party, if the representative
treated as an unauthorized intervention. The case takes a more limited view of inter-
vention than would possibly be taken today.
133. Harrington Bros. v. City of New York, 35 F. (2d) 1009 (S. D. N. Y. 1929).
134. Cases dealing with what constitutes a power coupled with an interest indicate how
confusing a distinction between an interest in a thing and an interest in its proceeds is. It
seems unnecessary to open the door to that confusion here.
135. Lombard Investment Co. v. Seaboard Mfg. Co., 74 Fed. 325 (C. C. S. D. Ala.
1896). The court apparently went on the theory that the petitioner's interest was protected
by the debtor's protection of his equity of redemption. On this theory then the right
to intervene should have been absolute because the representation would be inadequate.
Realistically, one might just as well speak of the debtor as representing the plaintiff-creditor
as to say he represents the petitioner-attaching creditor.
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has or represents some interest adverse to that of the petitioner, or fails
because of non-feasance in his duty of representation. The petitioners
in these cases are usually unsecured creditors, stockholders, or bond-
holders, and, in a somewhat different class of cases, taxpayers or rate-
payers. The theory is that stockholders are represented by the directors
and officers,18 bondholders by the trustees,3 7 and all creditors by the
receiver. 3 Some courts have gone so far as to term stockholders and
bondholders quasi-parties. 39 A more remote relationship exists in the
taxpayer and rate-payer cases. Although the would-be intervenors in
these cases are often said to be adequately represented by a local political
unit, the real reason for denying a right of intervention seems to be the
inadequacy of the petitioners' interest. 4 '
A stockholder cannot intervene unless he shows that he has asked the
directors and officers to present the claim or defense which he wishes
to offer, and has been refused by them, or shows facts indicating that
the request would be futile.141  This rule is derived by analogy from
Equity Rule 27, which limits the stockholder's right to bring a corporate
action to similar circumstances. 42 The rule seems justifiable where
the right of action accrues out of the usual corporate business.' 4' Although
the stockholders' control of directors and officers is often negligible due
both to control devices, such as all forms of non-voting stock, and to
the natural weakness of a large and widely separate group,144 it never-
136. See the discussion in Atlantic Refining Co. v. Port Lobos Petroleum Corporation,
280 Fed. 934 (D. Del. 1922).
137. See Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 15 F. (2d)
434, 440 (N. D. Ill. 1926).
138. Jones & Laughlans, Ltd. v. Sands, 79 Fed. 913, 914 (C. C. A. 2d, 1897). The court
spoke of them as "parties to the cause, being represented by the Yeceivers." The absolute
right of creditors to present their claims in a receivership was recognized; an appeal would
be allowed on rejection of the claim. Acme White Lead & Color Works v. Republic Motor
Truck Co., 285 Fed. 88 (E. D. Mich. 1922). Where creditors are adequately represented
and can show no interest in funds in the hands of the court, they have no absolute right to
intervene. Aronstam v. James, 273 Fed. 545 (E. D. N. Y. 1921).
139. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Port Lobos Petroleum Corp., 280 Fed. 934 (D. Del. 1922).
Some courts distinguish in this regard between bondholders and stockholders, as In Con-
tinental & Commercial Trust & Savings Bank v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 200 Fed. 600, 611 (E.
D. Wis. 1912) ; see Jones & Laughlins, Ltd. v. Sands, 79 Fed. 913 (C. C. A. 2d, 1897).
140. See infra, p. 594.
141. Acme White Lead & Color Works v. Republic Motor Truck Co., 284 Fed, 580,
581 (E. D. Mich. 1922).
142. Rxv. STAT. § 913 (1789), 28 U. S. C. A. § 723 (1926).
143. A distinction between ordinary corporation busineis and matters which are extra-
ordinaY is inherent in most corporation acts; by means of the distinction directors and
officers are allowed less freedom in selling all the corporate assets or in changing the cor-
porate structure, intrinsic elements in reorganization, and it seems peculiar that the same
distinction is not carried over into the receivership field as a matter of course.
144. We refer here to voting trusts, proxies, powers coupled with an interest, which in
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theless remains true that in ordinary affairs the directors and officers
act for the. corporation. The stockholder wishing to alter the normal
rule must show that the directors or officers have refused to act in the
alleged corporate interest, and that their refusal is not based on a lawful
discretion.14a Thus, where directors have admitted insolvency in a suit
by creditors for the appointment of a receiver, a stockholder has no
absolute right to intervene to prove solvency, unless he can show that
the directors acted in bad faith. 4 Nor can he intervene to show that
the court should have refused jurisdiction of receivership proceedings,
-when the directors, acting in good faith, caused the corporation to submit
to the jurisdiction of the court. 47 And a mere showing that the officers
and directors of his corporation are in effect appointed by the directors
of an opposing corporation, where there is a law suit pending between
the two, will not justify an absolute right to intervene.""9 Where, how-
a way are less important than the inertia and the uninformed character of stockholder
groups.
145. In ex parte Cutting, 94 U. S. 14 (1876), stockholders were refused permis-ion to
intervene in the foreclosure suit of third mortgage bondholders. The stockholders charged
fraud in the issuance of the bonds. Inte2rvention had been allowed to one stockholder but
he had withdrawn. A petition for mandamus to the Supreme Court %%as denied.
The rule that fraud must be shown combined with the rule that in equity intervention
must be in subordination to the main proceedings, puts the stockholder in a difficult pod-
tion. The best example of this is Whittaker v. Brictson Alfg. Co., 43 F. (2d) 485 (C. C. A.
8th, 1930) where an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed and notice served on a
director who was entirely inactive and did not advise anyone of the service. No defense
was made, and an order of adjudication entered. Stockholders then sought to intervene,
but this was refused on the basis that to contest the bankruptcy order would not be in
subordination to the main proceeding. It would not be necesary for a court in bankruptcy,
however, to apply the equity rule, although the tendency is in that direction. See In re 1030
North Building Corp., 7 F. Supp. 896 (E. D. Ill. 1934).
The rights of a stockholder to intervene are often said to be limited to a presentation of
those claims which the corporation could present. Big Creek Gap Coal and Iron Co. v.
American Loan & Trust Co., 127 Fed. 625 (C. C. A. 6th, 1904); Equitable Trust Co. of New
York v. Washington-Idaho Water, Light & Power Co., 300 Fed. 601 (E. D. Wash. 1924).
This would seem to be inapplicable to eorganizations.
146. In In re Eureka Anthracite Coal Co., 197 Fed. 216 (W. D. Ark. 1912), and in Guaran-
tee Trust & Safe-Deposit Co. v. Duluth & W. Rr. Co., 70 Fed. 803 (C. C. D. Binn. 1935), stock-
holders sought to intervene in foreclosure suit after a decree pro confesso had been signed,
but not entered. The stockholders alleged that the directors refused to defend and were
sacrificing the interests of the stockholders, and the court, not wishing to settle the matter
of fraud in a hearing upon affidavits, allowed intervention. See Cole v. Seaman, 266 Fed.
846 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920). But see Couch v. Central Bank & Trust Corporation, 297 Fed.
216 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924).
147. Scattergood v. American Pipe & Construction Co., 249 Fed. 23, 27 (C. C. A. 3d,
1918). In Central Trust Co. v. McGeorge, 151 U. S. 129 (1894), the defendant corporation
voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court and Yecelvers were appointed.
The venue was improper. Held, intervening creditors and stockholders could not raise the
objection of improper venue. Cf. McGraw v. Mott, 179 Fed. 646 (C. C. A. 4th, 1910).
148. This was the case in Atlantic Refining Co. v. Port Lobos Petroleum Corp., 280
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ever, the stockholder showed that the purpose of a voluntary bankruptcy
proceeding was to continue fraudulent directors in control, the fraud
being indicated by a state court suit based on fraudulent mismanagement
which terminated in an order for an accounting and the appointment
of a receiver, the right to intervention was held absolute.14 9
Since representation of all creditors by the receiver and of bondholders
by the trustee is peculiarly a reorganization problem in most cases, we
will defer discussion of these cases, and of additional problems having
to do with the representation of stockholders, until we come to the
broader subject of intervention by these classes in reorganization. 5 0
Taxpayers and rate-payers have not fared very well in their efforts
to secure an absolute right of intervention. Representation by the
governmental authorities is considered adequate in the absence of gross
negligence or bad faith on their part. A taxpayer could not intervene
in a bondholders' action brought to have the money paid by the bond-
holders impounded pending a decision of the state supreme court on
the legality of the bond issue.'"' A subscriber of a telephone company
had no absolute right to intervene in a suit by the utility against the
city to enjoin the enforcement of rates alleged to be confiscatory, even
though the subscriber expressed the apprehension that the city "may
or will relax its attention and energy to the detriment of petitioner and
the other subscribers of the company."' 2 Similarly, when a telephone
company sued the Public Service Commission to enjoin the enforcement
of alleged confiscatory rates, the City of New York had no absolute
right to intervene, as the commission adequately represented the city.'
And in a suit by a utility company against a municipality, the inter-
vention petition of a taxpayer, based on the theory that he had paid
in excess of the amount the company was allowed to charge and that
Fed. 934, 939 (D. Del. 1922). The court stated that "corporations controlled and man-
aged by the same officers and stockholders have a right to deal with each other." But
that is no argument for refusing intervention.
149. Zeitinger v. Hargadine-Mc~Ittrick Dry Goods Co., 244 Fed. 719 (C. C. A. 8th,
1917), cert. denied, 245 U. S. 667 (1917). The district court had denied the petition on the
ground that no defense could be made to the voluntary petition in bankruptcy. The appellate
court allowed the intervening petition and dismissed the voluntary petition in bankruptcy.
Accord: In re Beaver Cotton Mills, 275 Fed. 498 (N. D. Ga. 1921) (a minority stock-
holder permitted to intervene to contest bankruptcy proceedings, but application denied on
the merits).
150. See infra, p. 596 et seq.
151. Farmers' State Bank of New Washington, Ohio, v. Board of Commissionevs of
Jensen Bridge District, 295 Fed. 755 (S. D. Fla. 1920).
152. In re Englehard & Sons Co., 231 U. S. 646, 650 (1914). The attempt was made to
intervene as the representative of all the subscribers and this was denied. The trial court
in its discretion had allowed intervention as an individual matter. The city was said to be
the proper paTty to make defendant in the suit as representative of all interested.
153. City of New York v. New York Telephone Company, 261 U. S. 312 (1923).
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the city was about to compromise so that approximately only one-half
of the taxpayer's excess payment would be returned to him, was denied.'54
A recent case illustrates the close relation of the problem of inadequacy
of representation to the more general problem of whether the petitioner
has an adequate interest in any event. It hiso illustrates what has been
stressed above, that in many cases where intervention might be denied
as an absolute right, it would seem desirable that the trial court exercise
its discretion and allow intervention. In a suit by the Government to
restrain alleged violations of the then code of fair competition by the
defendant's refusal to deal with representatives of its employees, the
status of the local American Federation of Labor affiliate was in issue.
An employee sought to intervene to urge the unconstitutionality of the
code section, and the unrepresentative character of the union. The
court denied intervention: "The district attorney represents the people
in the proceeding. . . . The interest of the defendant (the company)
is the interest of the petitioner .... The employee of the defendant has
no better right to intervene than has an individual of the general public
in a multitude of litigated matters." In a case which involves the
question of the relationship between employer and employee, a contest
between company union and regular union, and the whole problem of
the constitutionality of Governmenial regulation, it would seem that
intervention, whether the right is absolute or not, would have been a
useful device both for enlightening the court and protecting the parties
for whose benefit the code was enacted.lrj
THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN RECEIVERSHIPS AND REORGANIZATION
PROCEEDINGS
Probably in no field of the law is intervention more important than
in the field of reorganization, whether reorganization be accomplished
through an equity receivership or bankruptcy proceedings. In no field
of the law, too, is a clarification of the problems of intervention more
necessary. The same rules applicable in other intervention cases should
be applied to reorganization proceedings. The petitioner, therefore,
should have an absolute right to intervene if he can show an interest
in the property in the hands of the court,166 or that he is inadequately
represented.5 7 In any given case, of course, the petitioner may have
an absolute right to intervene at one stage when he would not have
154. O'Connell v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 19 F. (2d) 460 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927);
cf. McKinney v. Black Panther Oil and Gas Co., 2S0 Fed. 436 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922).
155. United States v. Houde Engineering Corp., 9 F. Supp. 836 (W. D. N. Y. 1935).
The background of the litigation is discussed in Comment (1935) 4S HAas: L. R v. 630;
(1934) 34 CoL L. Ra-v. 1362.
156. See supra p. 582. 157. See supra p. 591.
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at another,158 or an absolute right to intervene for some purposes and
not for others. And iitervention for one purpose or at one stage will
not constitute an intervention for other purposes ov for all stages of the
proceeding. Further, the same petitioner may have at one time or for
one purpose an absolute right to intervene based on property in the
hands of the court; at another time or for another purpose an absolute
right to intervene based on inadequate representation; and, further, have
in other matters no absolute, but at most a discretionary right to inter-
vene. Thus, in reorganization proceedings, the petitioner most likely
can show an interest in property under the court's control, such as a
creditor's claim against the company, entitling him to intervene to
establish and protect that interest. Further, for other matters the peti.
tioner may have an absolute right to intervene based on inadequate
representation. And for still other matters the petitioner will probably
have no right to intervene at all, such as matters of administration
involved in running the company during the reorganization.
In most reorganization proceedings, three principal classes of persons
seek intervention: stockholders, bondholders, and creditors other than
bondholders. In most reorganization proceedings, too, there are different
classes of stockholders and of bondholders.150 The reorganization process
is designed somehow to adjust these conflicting interests by a "fair" plan.
The usual legal device employed in the past has been the simple fore-
closure, receivership, and sale; and the fiction underlying the device
dominated the picture of reorganization, 10 and affected the character of
the right to intervene.
The legal fiction was that bondholders and creditors had the right
to have the property sold to pay their debts; that the court would see
that the sale was fair, and would distribute the proceeds to the bond-
holders and the creditors. In strict theory they had no interest in the
property in the hands of the court until after the sale, and then only
in the proceeds." 1 They had an absolute right to intervene to file their
claims to the proceeds with a master;"0 2 the procedure was similar to
158. See Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).
159. Friendly points out that in the reorganization of the Missouri Pacific there were
72 different classes of security holders. Friendly, Amendment oj the Railroad Reorganiza.
tion A t (1936) 36 COL. L. Rxv. 27, 29.
160. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Toledo, Ann Arbor and North Michigan Ry. Co.,
67 Fed. 49, 55 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1895). Where the fiction of foreclosure and sale was not
employed, it was easier for the court apparently to pass upon the plan, and to hear dissenters,
Graselli Chemical Co. v. Aetna Explosives Co., 252 Fed. 456 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918), is such a
case where it was a stockholder reorganization. Wallace v. Motor Products Corp., 25 F.
(2d) 655 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928); Eagleson v. Pac. Timber Co., 270 Fed. 1008 (D. Del. 1920);
Willson v. Waltham Watch Co., 293 Fed. 811 (D. Mass. 1923); see also Wicher v. Del. Mines
Corp., 15 P. (2d) 610 (Idaho, 1932).
161. After the sale and before confirmation of the sale.




that followed in the historic intervention for an examination pro intcresse
sno, except that even when the "facts" were clear, the court would not
hear the claimant until the master had disallowed a claim or reduced
it by allowing the claim of another. But the theory that bondholders,
other creditors, and stockholders only had a claim to the proceeds ignored
the fact that these same groups in some combination would be the buyers
at the judicial sale'0 3 Originally the court took the view that the rivalry
that went on between bondholder groups, different classes of creditors,
and stockholders, or between majority and minority members of the
same group, and the inadequate representation of a class, 1 4 was out
of the court's province.' But partial protection was later provided"',
by the device of a constructive trust placed on the property of the old
corporation in the hands of the new,"0 7 by a consideration of the plan
163. This has been discussed from many angles. CRAvAvr, Raooa %1zLto. or CoT=oa,-
Tiors, Som LFGAL PHRAsES or Coa orATs FLn Azcn;G-REoo.w=e , ,vm Pxcr-r LTo:-
(1917) 153; Swaine, Reorgankation of Corporations: Certain Dvcdlopmerfs of the Past
Decade (1927) 27 CoL. L. Rv. 901; Rodgers, Rights and Duties of the Committee in Bond-
holders' Reorganiations (1929) 42 HARV. L. Rv. 899; Frank, Some Aspects of Corporate
Reorganization (1933) 19 VA. L. Rr-v. 69S; Foster, Conflicting Ideals for Reorganration
(1935) 44 YAI.E L. J. 923; Dodd, Reorganization Through Banhrupicy: A Remedy for
What? (1935) 48 HAav. L. REv. 1100; Rohrlich, The New Deal in Corporation Law (1935)
35 CoL. L. REv. 1167.
164. For instance, the original debenture holders' committee in the 'eorganization of
Paramount Publix. With the exception of Mr. Frank Vanderlip, who acquired debentures
after he became chairman, the committee "was from beginning to end a committee compo-_d
of people other than debenture holdersY Proceedings before Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, Matter of Paramount Reorganization (1935) 357.
165. Bowling Green Trust Co. v. Va. P. and P. Cox, 164 Fed. 753, 755 (C. C. Va. 1903).
Bondholders were allowed to file a plan of reorganization to be considered on the quezton
of whether an early sale should be ordered. But "with the fairness and equity of the plan
we have nothing to do." The trustee and individual bondholders filed plans.
166. For an explanation of the reasons for this change in judicial attitude, see Louih-
vile Trust Company v. Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway Company, 174 U. S.
674, 632 (1899); see Canada So. Rr. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527 (1883).
167. James v. Railroad Co., 73 U. S. 752 (1867); Railroad Co. v. Howard, 74 U. S. 392
(186S); Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville New Albany and Chicago Railway Co., 174 U. S.
674 (1899); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913); Kansas City Ry. v.
Guardian Trust Co., 240 U. S. 166 (1916) ; Hibernia Ins. Co. v. St. Louis and New Orleans
Trans. Co., 13 Fed. 516 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 182); Blair v. St. Louis, H. & K. Co., 25 Fed. 2
(C. C. E. D. Mo. 1885) (despite the fact that the petitioners' intervention pleas vere denied) ;
Central Trust Co. of New York v. Cincinnati, J. & AT. Ry. Co., S8 Fed. 500 (C. C. N. D. Ohio
1892) ; Chattanooga R. & C. Ry. Co. v. Evans, 66 Fed. 809 (C. C. A. 6th, 1895) ; Central of
Georgia Ry. Co. v. Paul, 93 Fed. 878 (C. C. A. 5th, 1899) ; St. Louis Trust Co. v. Des Moines,
N. & W. Ry. Co., 101 Fed. 632 (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1900); Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. United States and Mexican Trust Co., 221 Fed. 545 (C. C. A. Sth, 1915); Okmulgec
Window Glass v. Frink, 260 Fed. 159 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918); Mountain States Power Co.
v. A. L. Jordan Lumber Co., 293 Fed. 502 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923); Wabash Railway Co. v.
Mashall, 224 Mich. 593, 195 N. W. 134 (1923); Montgomery Web Co. v. Dienelt, 133
Pa. 585, 19 AtI. 428 (1890); Hurd v. New York and Commercial Steam Laundry Co,
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on a hearing for confirmation of the sale,108 and by the setting of an
upset price."0 9 The state courts sometimes added the device of trustee-
purchase, whereby if the majority committee which was about to buy
in at the sale did not offer what the court thought to be a fair plan, the
court would order the trustee to buy in the property for all the bond-
holdersY.70  The courts were shaking themselves loose from the theory
that this was merely a foreclosure or receivership and sale.
167 N. Y. 89, 60 N. E. 327 (1901). There was a slight possibility of holding members of the
reorganization committee liable if the dissenter were a depositor. Industrial and General
Trust Ltd. v. Tod., 180 N. Y. 215, 73 N. E. 7 (1905); Ginty v. Ocean Shore Rr. Co.,
172 Cal. 31, 155 Pac. 77 (1916). The type of unfairness recognizable in the omission of
a class is somewhat different, however, than the type of unfairnem concerning a minority
member of one class.
168. Previous to the sale the courts often felt themselves unable to consider the plan.
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Chicago, M. and St. P. Ry. Co., 15 F. (2d) 434,
440 (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1926). The St. Paul reorganization is described in LOWNTMU, TUE
INVEsToR PAYS (1933). Simon v. New Orleans T. and M. Rr. Co., 242 Fed. 62 (C. C. A.
5th, 1917). Petition to intervene and oppose the order of sale on the basis of unfairnes
was denied. But, while intervention was denied, a hearing on the merits was had at the
confirmation of the sale. See Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. v. Chicago Ry. Co,
158 Fed. 923 (C. C. A. 7th, 1907). Occasionally a hearing was had on the plan insofar
as it affected the order of sale or the time for the sale. Guaranty Trust Co. of New Yoyk
v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 238 Fed. 812 (E. D. Mo. 1916). Bondholders of a sub-
sidiary line were also creditors of the general line which assumed the mortgage. They
were allowed to intervene in the foreclosure suit and object to the plan before the stle.
In Habirshaw Electric Cable Co. v. Habirshaw Electric Cable Co. Inc., 296 Fed. 875
(C. C. A. 2d, 1924), the plan was considered upon application for an order of sale by
the reorganization committee, although there evidently had been no formal intervention by
that committee. The appellate court approved this procedure of looking at the plan. The
older view is illustrated in First National Bank v. Shedd, 121 U. S. 74 (1887).
For the theory that the court has no jurisdiction over the plan, see First Nat. Bank v.
Flershem, 290 U. S. 504 (1934). In Rospigliosi v. New Orleans, M. I. C. R. Co., 237 Fed.
341 (C. C. A. 5th, 1916), the petitioner wished to intervene to have the confirmation of
the sale set aside on the theory of inadequacy of the bid and unfairness of the plan. The
court, in denying leave, said it had nothing to do with the plan. See Blanks v. Farmers'
Loan and Trust Co., 122 Fed. 849 (C. C. A. 5th, 1903); Moore v. Splitdorf Electrical
Co., 114 N. J. Eq. 358, 168 AtI. 74 (1933). Only rarely did the plan get an early hearing;
even then the viewpoint of the court was that it was only to see if there was patent
unfairness. Gates v. Boston and New York Air Line Railroad Co., 53 Conn. 33, 5 At.
695 (1885); see Sullivan v. St. Louis-San Francisco Rr. Co., 147 Misc. 485, 263 N. Y,
Supp. 396 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
169. Central Trust Co. of New York v. Washington County Rr. Co., Co., 124 Fed. 813
(C. C. D. Me. 1903). The court treated stockholders and bondholders as parties allowed to
intervene in order to hear their exceptions to the master's report. An upset price was fixed,
but it is moot whether it was fixed with the idea of protecting the minorities or of forcing
them into the plan. Equitable Trust Co. of New York v. Western Pacific Ry. Co., 233
Fed. 335 (N. D. Cal. 1916). This was not always done. Provident Life and Trust Co.
of Philadelphia v. Camden, 177 Fed. 854 (C. C. A. 3d, 1910); Weiner, Conflicting Functions
ol the Upset Price (1927) 27 COL. L. REV. 132. Occasionally in the absence of an upset
price it was held the price bid must not be inadequate. Ballentyne v. Smith, 205 U. S.
285 (1907). But usually something more than that had to be shown.
170. First National Bank in Wichita v. Neil, 137 Kan. 436, 20 P. (2d) 528 (1933).
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But considering the plan at the time of confirmation of the sale, and
with the emphasis on the sale, was likely to be too late, and therefore
inadequate to protect minority groups.' The latter found themselves
attacking what was apparently the work of years, the result of com-
promise and study; they found themselves asking the court to upset
what apparently had the support of the majority. - They found it
difficult to urge economic arguments, not easily understood at best,
against a finished product 73 Various types of legislation were proposed;
longing glances were cast at the English Joint Stock Companies Arrange-
ment Act.'74 The result was reached in sections 77171 and 77B111 of the
Bankruptcy Act which require the court to consider the fairness of
the plan before confirming. 7 7 But the argument as to when the court
should consider the fairness of the plan still goes on. And in equity re-
ceiverships, although it does not seem as though any court would refuse to
consider the fairness of the plan, in view of the persuasive effect of
sections 77 and 77B, the problem still remains: at what time will it do
so?178 If the plan is only going to be considered at the end of the
proceedings, little actual protection will be afforded minority groups.'
But see Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Robin, 361 Ill. 261, 198 N. E. 4 (1935); note (1936)
49 H Rv. L. Rav. 487. And in the federal courts also if the indenture provided for it.
Sage v. Central Rr. Co., 99 U. S. 334 (1878); Werner, Harris and Buck v Equitable Trust
Co., 35 F. (2dj 513 (C. C. A. 10th, 1929) (minority bondholders had the sale, and an
order allowing the trustee to bid in, set aside).
171. Undoubtedly the threat of a refusal by the court to confirm the sale because of
unfairness of the plan may have given greater bargaining power to minority groups. But
the number of plans actually upset is small. The courts constantly reiterate that they
are not the makers of the plans, and unless some unfairness can be shown they wil not
refuse to confirm because the plan might be better.
172. In Duncan v. Mobile, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4139 (C. C. S. D. Ala. 1879), p. 25, where the
court considered the plan on foreclosure befo*re the decree of sale, the court said: "We have
examined this scheme and if not perfectly equitable, we are unable to point out any want of
fairness in it." The court then decreed that the minority must be allowed to participate on the
same basis as the majority in this inequitable but fair plan.
173. Jameson v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 20 F. (2d) 808 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927).
174. ComTAv-is Acr or 1929, 19 & 20 GEo. V., c. 23, § 153 (1929). Rosenberg, A
New Scheme of Reorganization (1917) 17 COL. L. REv. 523; Rosenberg, Reorganizationr-
The Next Step (1922) 22 COL. L. Rav. 14; Fraser, Reorganization of Companies in Canada
(1927) 27 CoL. L. REv. 932.
175. 49 STAT. 911, 11 U. S. C. A. § 205 (1935).
176. 49 STAT. 965, 11 U. S. C. A. § 207 (1935).
177. Friendly, Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganization Act (1934) 48 Hnv.
L. R v. 39; Hanna, Corporate Reorganization under the Banh.ruplcy Act (1935) 21 A. B.
A. J. 73, 76.
178. As long as the orthodox theory is that the court is not to supervise reorganization,
nor require a "best" plan, it is important that unfairness be detected at the initial stages.
For the orthodox theory, see Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments
of the Past Decade (1927) 27 CoL. L. Rxv. 901.
179. Fearon v. Bankers' Trust Co., 238 Fed. 83 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916), where first mortgage
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What were the stockholders, creditors and bondholders doing while
this process was going on? What rights did they have? All had the
right to file their claims before the master, and to contest his allowance
of other claims which might diminish theirs. But what other rights did
they have to come into these proceedings which were being conducted
for their benefit?
If the stockholders attempted to intervene they were usually told that
they were adequately represented by their directors and officers,180 unless
they could show that the directors and officers were practicing fraud or
collusion, 81 or that the interests of the directors and officers were suffi-
ciently opposed to that of the stockholders. 82  Thus, if the directors
had purposely brought the company into bankruptcy in order to allow
themselves in another capacity as bondholders to gain complete owner-
ship of the corporation, the stockholders were permitted to intervene.'85
bondholders were refused leave to intervene, illustrates the futility of a late hearing on
the plan, and the superficial manner in which a court is compelled to consider the plan
at that time.
180. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Chicago, M. and St. P. Ry. Co., 15 F. (2d)
434 (W. D. ll. 1926) (virtual ownership of the corporation would not change this); Coffin
v. Chattanooga Water & Power Co., 44 Fed. 533 (C. C. S. D. Tenn. 1891). This
tefers to the right absolute. Sometimes when the stockholder had no absolute right
to intervention, intervention was allowed in the discretion of the court. Such was the
case in Lincoln Printing Co. v. Middle West Utilities Co., 74 F. (2d) 779, 784 (C. C. A.
7th, 1935). There remained the absolute right to file claims and contest the claims
of others before the master. This was recognized even in Forbes v. Memphis, E. P. & P. R.
Rr. Co., 9 Fed. Cas. No. 4,926 (C. C. W. D. Tex. 1872), p. 408, which doubted whether inter-
vention would be allowed stockholders on a suggestion of fraud on the part of corporate offi-
cers. See Seaman v. Adler, 266 Fed. 846 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Inter-
national Pump, 231 Fed. 594 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916); Daly v. Opelousas Ins. Agency, 181 La. 89,
158 So. 631 (1935).
181. On the other hand it was once doubted whether "in any case where a suit is
properly instituted against a corporation, a stockholder of that corporation can, even on a
suggestion of fraud on the part of its officers, come in by way of intervention as party
to that suit and seek to defend or control the proceedings." Forbes v. Memphis, E. P. & P. R.
Co., 9 Fed. Cas. No. 4,926, p. 408. But the charge of fraud apparently was directed at the
receiver; moreover the charge was regarded as groundless by the court.
Intervention may be denied despite a charge of fraud, otherwise substantively sufficient,
against directors and officers, if it appears that the stockholder is having a judicial hearing
of his claim which will be unimpaired by the present case. Lewis v. Baltimore & L. Rr.
Co., 62 Fed. 218 (C. C. A. 4th, 1894). In this case intervention was sought in the cross
bill for foreclosure filed by the first mortgage trustee, and denied.
182. Or that the directors and officers were so negligent as to be indicative of fraud.
Guarantee Trust & Safe-Deposit Co. v. Duluth & W. Rr. Co., 70 Fed. 803 (C. C. D. Minn.
1895). See Atlantic Refining Co. v. Port Lobos Petroleum Corp., 280 Fed. 934 (D. Del.
1922).
183. United States Trust Co. of New York v. Chicago Terminal Transfer R. Co., 188
Fed. 292 (C. C. A. 7th, 1911); cf. Geddes v. Anaconda Mining Co., 254 U. S. 990 (1921);
American Seating Co. v. Bullard, 290 Fed. 896 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923).
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Or if there were two classes of stockholders, and the would-be intervenors
could show that one class, opposed to them, had control of the directors,
intervention was permitted.""
But to say that stockholders are represented by their directors in a
reorganization is to forget that in reorganization "the corporate structure
or entity ... becomes diaphanous, and the stockholders emerge as the
real parties in interest."'81 5 It is no longer a matter of corporate business.
It is a question of class against class, and a group struggle within a class.
The directors were not elected to conduct such business. Thus, one
court, reasoning along similar lines, allowed the stockhblders to intervene
when they were in form certificate holders, the ownership of the legal
interest in the stock being in voting trustees whom the stockholders had
not appointed. It was the theory of the court that the stockholders'
control over the directors elected by the voting trustees was not sufficient
to justify a holding that they were adequately xepresented.6 0 But
practically it would seem that stockholders are often inadequately repre-
sented by directors and officers who may be bondholders, or associated
with bondholders, or desire to be continued in office by the new stock-
holders. One example should illustrate this clearly. Under section 77B
of the Bankruptcy Act the stockholders are given a great deal of power
if insolvency is not found, or if the judge Has not found that they will
be unaffected by the plan.'8 Would any one urge that the proper repre-
sentatives in such a case should be the directors who may honestly believe
the corporation to be insolvent, and possibly not being more than nominal
stockholders themselves, might have no further interest in protecting
the rights of the stockholders?'
The creditors were told that they were represented by the receiver
or by the trustee appointed by the court'8 Before they could intervene
184. Hamlin v. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. Rr. Co., 78 Fed. 664 (C. C. A. 6th, 1897). The
stockholders of one class will be required to join if they intervene. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. Rr.
Co. v. Continental Trust Co., 95 Fed. 497 (C. C. A. 6th, 1899), cert. denied, 176 U. S. 219
(1900). If there were a divergence of interest within the class, however, intervention -hould
be allowed without joining. The Farmers2 Loan and Trust Co. v. The New York and
Northern Railway Co., 150 N. Y. 410, 44 N. E. 1043 (1896) (the absolute right
given to minority shareholders where the majority stockholders and bondholders were bringing
the foreclosure suit pursuant to a plan to gain complete ownership of the corporation).
185. In re National Lock Co., 9 F. Supp. 432 (N. D. Ill. 1934). The actual case in-
volved reorganization under section 77B of the bankruptcy act. But iee In re O'Gara Coal
Co., 260 Fed. 742 (C. C. A. 7th, 1919).
186. In re Babcock, 26 F. (2d) 153 (C. C. A. 7th, 1928).
187. Cf. Manhattan Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Lucey Mfg. Co., 5 F. (2d) 39 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
188. It is not entirely clear that stockholders may not have some added right under
section 77B even if insolvency is shown. In re Reading Hotel Corp., 10 F. Supp. 470, 471
(E. D. Pa. 1935); see Sabel, Recent Economic Developments in Corporate Reorgarization
(1936) 20 Mmir. L. REv. 117, 137.
189. Thus in Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Doherty, 286 Fed. 926 (C. C. A. 6th,
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they had to show that such representation was inadequate.19 0 Thus,
in one case where it was a question of the receiver's being allowed his
fee from the court, the creditors could intervene to contest the amount.19 1
Or if they could show that the property had been in receivership for
an inordinate length of time (here, over four years) and that no progress
had been made under the receiver either towards sale or rehabilitation,
they were allowed to intervene on the question of setting a date for the
sale.192 If they could go further and show that the bondholders and
the stockholders had combined in a plan to eliminate creditors other
than bondholders; and were in the process of doing so, the court would
allow the creditors to intervene to be heard on the plan.1 03  No mention
is made of the position of the receiver in such cases. Supposedly the
theory would be that, in allowing the combination, he had proved him-
self inadequate. But, actually, the receiver is put in to conserve the
property; he has very little to do with creditors in working out a plan
of reorganization. There would seem to be no reason, therefore, why
he should be held to represent them.
The bondholders were told that they were represented by the trustee.194
1923), lienholders were denied the absolute right to intervene in a receivership when they
desired to file a cross-bill for the collection of stock subscriptions, when the receiver had
not refused to take such action.
For reorganization matters, the receiver has sometimes been considered their representative,
Conley v. International Pump Co., 237 Fed. 286, 287 (S. D. N. Y. 1915) (Intervention was
denied stockholders who charged unfairness of the plan and collusion between bondholders
and officers. The court felt that it had little to do with the fairness of the plan, and that
the receiver would defend adequately for the stockholders.).
190. Jones & Laughlins, Ltd. v. Sands, 79 Fed. 913 (C. C. A. 2d, 1897); Aronstam v.
James, 273 Fed. 545 (E. D. N. Y. 1921). Where the right to intervene is not absolute
because of representation by the receiver, the court may still allow intervention, and refuse
to grant leave to sue the receiver in any other manner. Field v. Kansas City Refining Co.,
296 Fed. 800 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924), cert. denied, 266 U. S. 618 (1924). This is said not
to be contrary to Adler v. Seaman, 266 Fed. 828 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920), since there is said
to be no coercion. As to coercion, compare United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1935).
191. King v. Hiawatha Silk Mills, Inc., 296 Fed. 907 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
192. First Federal Trust Co. v. First National Bank of San Francisco, 297 Fed. 353
(C. C. A. 9th, 1924). The appellate court was unable to find out whether the trial court
had permitted or denied intervention.
In Haines v. Buckeye Wheel Co., 224 Fed. 289 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915), it was proper for
the court to allow creditors to intervene in a receivership pyroceeding when the creditors
claimed that the receiver was violating his authority.
193. This is clearly so after there has been a sale. Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville,
New Albany and Chicago Railway Company, 174 U. S. 674 (1899). It was apparently
successfully urged previous to the sale in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. United States
and Mexican Trust Co., 221 Fed. 545 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915).
194. Palmer v. Bankers' Trust Co., 12 F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Guaranty
Trust Co. of New York v. Minneapolis & St. L. Rr. Co., 52 F. (2d) 418 (C. C. A. 8th,
1931). A different problem is p~esented where the question is the right of senior mortgage
bondholders to intervene in the foreclosure suit of junior bondholders. The right is
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The outstanding quality of the modern corporate trustee is apt to be
its inactivity. The indenture is drawn so as to save the trustee harmless
from everything except gross negligence. The trustee may have neglected
to have notified the bondholders of the default.les He may be connected
with the house of issue. He very probably has some affiliation with
the members of the majority bondholders' committee.'00 Yet in most
cases he is said to be the adequate representative of the bondholders,
with the result that they are denied an absolute right to intervene.",7
Even a showing that the trustee is the trustee of two bond issues and
must therefore represent conflicting interests has been held an insufficient
indication of inadequacy,"0 8 although it seems clear that the modern
absolute, apart from any question of trustee representation. Compton v. Jesup, 6$ Fed.
263 (C. C. A. 6th, 1S95), questions certified and answered in 167 U. S. 1 (1897). When
the trustee represents both senior and junior mortgagor, the junior bondholders have been
given an absolute right to intervene. Northampton Trust Co., Trustee, v. Northampton
Traction Co., 270 Pa. 199, 112 At!. 871 (1921); cf. Carpenter v. Catlin, 44 Barb. 75 (N. Y.
1865); see Chase National Bank of City of New York v. 10 East 40th Street Corp., 238
App. Div. 370, 264 N. Y. Supp. 832 (Ist Dep't 1933) (minority bondholders' committee
was allowed to intervene in foreclosure suit for the purpose of attacking it; however,
the trustee did not oppose their intervening).
195. Cf. Richards v. Chesapeake & 0. Rr. Co., 20 Fed. Cas. No. 11,771 (C. C. E. D.
Va. 1876) p. 692. As a business practice this is a frequent occurrence. See Posner, Liability
of the Corporate Trustee (1928) 42 HAxv. L. REv. 198. Arguments in justification concern
the state of the merket, the welfare of the country, and the discretion of the trustee.
196. In Shaw v. Railroad Co., 100 U. S. 605 (1379), where intervention was denied
bondholders on the theory that they were represented by trustees, two of the trustees
were creditors whose debts were provided for in the plan of reorganization. In Trust
Company of America v. Norfolk & S. Ry. Co., 174 Fed. 269 (C. C. E. D. Va. 1909), the
bondholder alleged that the trustee was acting with the majority bondholders' committee
and was causing the indebtedness of the corporation to be augmented in excas of the
real indebtedness. Intervention was denied on the theory that the right to go against
the proceeds of the sale was sufficient protection. See Continental & Commercial Trust
& Savings Bank v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 200 Fed. 600, 607, 612 (E. D). Wis. 1912). In Central
Trust Co. of New York v. Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. Co., 169 Fed. 486 (C. C. S. D. Ohio, 1903)
a court refused intervention to bondholders despite the fact that the trustees 'represented con-
flicting interests, which is exceedingly probable where the trustee is a bank or trust company.
It was said that the bondholder was sufficiently protected by his ability to appear before
the master to file and contest claims. Cf. Brown v. Denver Omnibus & Cab Co., 254
Fed. 560 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918).
197. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 15 F. (2d)
434, 440 (N. D. 11. 1926). Where the trustee's own personal interest is involved, as against
that of the bondholders, intervention should be allowed as an absolute *ight. Thus where
the trustee's compensation is in dispute, the bondholders can intervene. Williams v. Morgan,
111 U. S. 684 (1894). The trustee had also acted as receiver and this involved compensa-
tion in that capacity.
In some cases intervention by bondholders is allowed as a discretionary matter, when
the absolute right may be questioned. Ex parte Jordan, 94 U. S. 248 (1876).
198. Clyde v. Richmond & D. Rr. Co., 55 Fed. 445 (C. C. E. D. Va. 1893). The




view would allow intervention here. Furthermore, in any contested
reorganization, there will be conflicting groups in one class of bond-
holders.' 9  How can the trustee represent them all? To deny inter-
vention is at variance with the idea that intervention will be permitted
by a court in order to see that its processes will not be used to prejudice
the rights of interested third persons.
The problem of allowing stockholders, creditors and bondholders to
intervene is an extrinsic part of the larger problem of the court's con-
sideration of the plan. It will do no good to have the court consider
the plan, if only the proponents thereof are before the court. 20 0  The
persons who are interested must be before the court before any advance
in reorganization practice will have been made. The further question
of when the court should consider the plan still remains and is also
bound up with the question of intervention. For it will do little good
to allow intervention at the final stages of a proceeding when the claim
of the petitioners will appear as a minority attempt to defeat the work
of many months, many minds, much labor and much cost." 1
The reorganization statutes, liberally interpreted, indicate a trend
towards allowing greater rights of intervention. Section 77B states
that "any creditor or stockholder shall have the right to be heard on
the question of the appointment of any trustee or trustees, and on the
proposed confirmation of any reorganization plan, and upon filing a
petition for leave to intervene, on such other questions arising in the
proceeding as the judge shall determine. ' 20 2  The provisions of the act
expressly giving an absolute right to intervene can easily be over-
emphasized. The appointment of a trustee and confirmation of a plan,
important as they are, do not go to the essence of the reorganization
problem, which is the consideration of the plan in its formative stage
with all the conflicting interests before the court, and with the court
cognizant of its duty to aid in the formulation of a plan when necessary.
199. Galveston Railroad Co. v. Coudrey, 11 Wall. 459 (U. S. 1870); Farmers Loan
and Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. Rr. Co., 66 Fed. 169 (C. C. S. D. Wis. 1895) ; Farmers,
Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. Rr. Co., 70 Fed. 423 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1895); Cen-
tral Trust Company of New York v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Rr. Co., 218 Fed. 336 (C. C. A.
2d, 1914); JONsS, CoPOATE BONDS AND MORTGAGES (3d ed. 1907) § 398a.
200. Notice the development portrayed in Cary v. Houston and T. C. Ry. Co., 45
Fed. 438 (C. D. E. D. Tex. 1891), and Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogatt, 250 U. S. 483
(1919); see Temmer v. Denver Tramway Co., 18 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
201. Palmer v. Bankers' Trust Co., 12 F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926). Intervention
was denied to bondholders but their arguments were heard in couft as to the unfairness
of the plan. The court stressed the fact that 847 of the refunding bonds and 98% of
the adjustment bonds were in favor of it, and that the Interstate Commerce Commission
had approved of it. See Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry.
Co., 15 F. (2d) 434 (N. D. I1l. 1926).
202. 77B (c) (10).
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Under the terms of the act, intervention relative to all other matters
save the filing of claims and appointment of trustees, and confirmation
of the plan might be said to be discretionary, because of the contrast in
language: an express absolute grant of the right to be heard relative to
the appointment of a trustee and to the confirmation of a plan on the
one hand, and a vague grant of the right to file a petition for leave to
intervene on other matters. This interpretation, however, would be
most unfortunate since, unless unusual protection is given minorities,
Section 77B may be an effective weapon for destroying their rights. -0
It is suggested, therefore, that the theory of intervention heretofore ad-
vanced should be applicable to reorganizations under Section 77B,
recognizing that under this section reorganization is no longer a mere
foreclosure sale and that the real parties are creditors, bondholders, and
stockholders. °0 This theory is supplemented by the rationale of the
statute giving the court power to disregard the provisions of deposit
agreements,Oa and thus avoid one kind of representation of creditors,
which in many ways was no less inadequate ' ° than that furnished bond-
holders by their trustees, creditors by the receiver or trustee, and stock-
holders by their directors.200 Similar considerations and criticisms apply
to Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act
-20 7
203. Bondholders denied the right to intervene in 77B proceedings. In re General
Theatre Equipment Inc., 12 F. Supp. 785 (D. Del. 1935). The necessity to fWe an inter-
vening petition still remains. In re Milwaukee and Sawyer Bldg. Corp., 79 F. (2d) 473
(C. C. A. 7th, 1935). By disregarding ordinary intervention rules, that is, that the owner
of property in the custody of the court may intervene, the petitioner claiming to be the
owner of property under 77B proceedings, was denied intervention. In re 1030 North
Dearborn Bldg. Corp., 7 F. Supp. 896 (E. D. Ill. 1934). See In re St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry. Co., U. S. Dist. Ct. (E. D. Mo. Nov. 4, 1933), unreported (deals with Ssction 77 prior
to its amendments).
204. In line with this theory is the holding that the trustee may not vote on the pro-
posed plan as the representative of bondholders in the absence of an express provision in
the indenture. In re Allied Owners Corp., 74 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); note (1935)
2 U. or Cni. L. R v. 644. It may be suggested that a provision in the indenture giving
the power may well be disregarded by the court.
205. 77B (b) (10). See In re South Coast Co., 8 F. Supp. 43 (D. Del. 1934).
206. The ability of reditors and stockholders to present plans under the Act also leads
to this interpretation. As an example of intervention under the act, see In re Hotel Gibson
Co., 11 F. Supp. 30 (S. D. Ohio 1935). On committees intervening prior to 77B see
Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry. Co., 160 Fed. 222 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1903);
Penn Steel Co. v. New York City Railway Co., 181 Fed. 285 (S. D. N. Y. 1910).
207. Section 77, despite amendments, partly because of them, is unclear as to the nature
of the right to intervene which it purports to give. It is stated that any creditor or
stockholder "shall have the right to be heard on all questions arising in the proceedings,
and upon petition thereof and cause shown any such per-on or any other interested party
mnay be permitted to intervene." This section may be said to give only the discretionary right
to intervene, unless other broad principles of intervention practice are introduced. The unusual
powers granted a court under section 77, broader than those given under section 77B, make it
extremely important not only that creditors and stockholders be heard, but where they are in
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A distinction should be made between the formal bringing of the
reorganization proceeding, whatever form that may take, the administra-
tion of the estate and the reorganizing process. Any representative,
unless more is shown, is competent to initiate the reorganization pro-
ceeding. 08 Unless the danger of a fraudulent dismissal is indicated,
there is no need to allow intervention for that matter and at that stage.
In the administration of the estate under the receiver or trustee, even
to the issuance of ordinary receiver's or trustee's certificates, it seems
unnecessary to allow intervention as an absolute right unless fraud,
adverse interest, or non-feasance on the part of the receiver or trustee
can be shown. But in the working out of a reorganization plan which
would include the formation of committees, the solicitation of deposits,
the substance of deposit agreements, and anything involving the status
of a class, it is to be hoped that the plan will be considered in its formative
stages, and that creditors of all types and stockholders will have the
absolute right to intervene. The compromise of claims by the receiver
would also seem to be a step sufficiently connected with any reorgan-
ization to categorize it as a part of the reorganizing process. Further-
more, if the creditors or stockholders give proxies to committees to
represent them, the court should be able, even without a statute, to
peruse this agreement to see whether representation is in reality ade-
quate.20 9 The cry that if this were so the court would be overwhelmed with
parties to the action seems unconvincing. Actually, in reorganization pro-
ceedings, the court has often heard dissenters. The appellate courts,
seemingly not sure whether intervention should be allowed or not, have
discussed the merits of the dissenters' petition on appeal. Allowing
intervention in the manner suggested will serve, not only to clarify the
situation, but also to facilitate the intervention of dissenters previous
to any confirmation of the sale, and the hearing of their arguments at
a time when the court may see the plan grow before it.
If intervention is to be freely allowed as suggested, court supervision
fact inadequately represented, that they have the right to appeal. But see Friendly, The
1935 Amendment of the Railroad Reorganization Act (1936) 36 COL. L. REV. 27. See
Comment (1935) 3 U. or CiEr. L. RIv. 63.
208. It has been held that bondholders' committees have no absolute right to intervene
on the question of the good faith of the filing of the petition, in 77B proceedings, In re
Prairie Ave. Bldg. Corp., 11 F. Supp. 125 (E. D. Ill. 1935).
209. The courts without the aid of statute have disregarded the provisions of trust
indentures, limiting the right of a bondholder to insist on foreclosures unless a certain
percentage of bondholders request the trustee to foreclose. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.
v. Kansas City, W. & N. W. Co., 53 Fed. 182 (C. C. D. Kan. 1892); First Nat. Fire Ins.
Co. v. Stephen Salisbury, 130 Mass. 303 (1881); cf. Rodman v. Richfield Oil Co. of Cal.,
66 F. (2d) 244 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933); Lowenthal, The Stock Exchange and Protective
Committee Securities (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 1293; see Douglas, Protective Committee i
Railroad Reorganization (1934) 47 HARv. L. Rav. 565.
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of the allowance of committee fees is a necessary corollary. The dis-
allowance or the allowance of inadequate fees may only result in mulct-
ing the depositors, or the stockholders of the new corporation. It should
be possible for a court, with the aid of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission in cases arising under Section 77, and with the aid of masters in
other cases, to anticipate the amount of fees to be allowed in a particular
reorganization. The fact that intervention is often sought solely to gain
the allowance of fees by the court could be taken care of by such a
procedure.2'0
It is believed that the absolute right to intervene as heretofore out-
lined is essential in protecting the interests of third persons, whether
the litigation be simple, or complex as in reorganization. If this view
is sound, the discretionary right to intervene becomes less important.
But as pointed out in several instances, the grant of intervention in
many of the discretionary cases facilitates the disposal in one action of
claims involving common questions of law or fact, and thus avoids both
court congestion and undue delay and expense to all parties. The dis-
cretionary right to intervene is a corollary of the permissive joinder,
class suit, bill of peace with multiple parties, joint hearing and con-
solidation statutes and rules predicated upon the theory that when
claims or defenses have a question of law or fact common to each other
a sound administrative scheme of procedure should encourage one action
or hearing rather than a multiplicity of actions or hearings.
210. In Greenbaum v. Lehrenkrauss Corp., 9 F. Supp. 425 (E. D. N. Y. 1935), preferred
stockholders were denied leave to intervene in equity reorganization proceedings when the
court thought the chief reason for requesting intervention was to gve the stockholders'
committee standing for an allowance. Cf. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. International C. E.
Corp., 66 Fed. (2d) 409 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) (where there was supervision over the under-
writing fee); In re Republic Gas Corp., U. S. District Court (S. D. N. Y. Nov. 21, 1935);
In re Paramount Publix Corporations, 12 F. Supp. 823 (S. D. N. Y. 1935); In re Kentucky
Electric Power Corp., 11 F. Supp. 528 (W. D. Ky. 1935). The result reached in In re
Diversy Bldg. Corp., U. S. Dist. Ct. (W. D. Ill. May 17, 1935), may be questioned. See
In re Mortgage Security Corp. (S. D. N. Y. 1935) unreported; In re Milady's Footwear
Corp. (S. D. N. Y. 1935), unreported; Medill, Fees and Expenses in a Corporate Reorgan-
ization Under Section 77B (1936) 34 MicH. L. REv. 331.
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